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  THE DISPENSABLE LIVES OF SOLDIERS 
 Gabriella  Blum 
1  
 ABSTRACT 
  Why are all soldiers fair game in war? This paper challenges the status-based 
distinction of the laws of war, calling instead for revised targeting doctrines that 
would place further limits on the killing of enemy soldiers. I argue that the chang-
ing nature of wars and militaries casts doubts on the necessity of killing all enemy 
combatants indiscriminately.  
  I offer two amendments: The ﬁ  rst is a reinterpretation of the principle of 
distinction, suggesting that the status-based classiﬁ  cation be complemented by 
a test of threat. Consequently, combatants who pose no real threat would be 
spared from direct attack. The second is a reinterpretation of the principle of mili-
tary necessity, introducing a least-harmful-means test,   under which an alterna-
tive of capture or disabling of the enemy would be preferred to killing whenever 
feasible.  
  I discuss the practical and normative implications of adopting these amend-
ments, suggesting possible legal strategies of bringing them about.  
 1.  INTRODUCTION 
  In 1951, the U.S. naval command struck the Kapsan compound in North 
Korea, where Chinese and North Korean ofﬁ  cials were attending a meeting 
(Peebles 2005, 79). The surprise attack destroyed the entire camp, killing 
an estimated 510–530 Chinese and North Korean personnel, including 144 
party ofﬁ  cials (Pontrelli 2007, 64–65; Reynolds 2005, 463), and obliterated 
the archives of the North Korean Communist Party (Peebles 2005, 80). 
1      Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Ken Anderson, Yishai Beer, 
Rachel Brewster, Glenn Cohen, Jack Goldsmith, Jim Greiner, Moshe Halbertal, Stephen 
Holmes, Sam Issacharoff, Asa Kasher, Adriaan Lanni, Daryl Levinson, Larry May, Gerry Neuman, 
Ben Sachs, Roy Schondorf, Jed Shugerman, Matthew Stephenson, Roberto Unger, and Adrian 
Vermeule and the reviewer for the   Journal of Legal Analysis  for their helpful comments, sugges-
tions, and debates. I also thank the participants of the Harvard Law School faculty workshop 
and of the Just and Unjust Wars seminar at NYU Law School for their engagement with this 
piece. Natalie Lockwood provided outstanding research assistance and contributed her own 
thoughts and suggestions. All errors are mine.    
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The outraged Communist broadcasts on Radio Pyongyang put a price on 
the heads of the Navy pilots, referring to them as the “butchers of Kapsan”—
a term proudly adopted thereafter by the Navy itself (Pontrelli 2007, 60–66). 
In 1991, the U.S. military pounded with airstrikes and gunﬁ  re a convoy of 
Iraqi troops retreating from Kuwait. Although the ultimate death toll was 
lower than the initial reports of thousands of casualties (Heidenrich 1993), 
reporters who arrived on the scene “recorded the carnage that stretched 
along that road for miles, producing gut-wrenching images of charred 
bodies in the blackened hulks of bombed-out vehicles. Trucks, personnel 
carriers, and hundreds of civilian vehicles lay strewn along the road,” a 
road they later dubbed “the Highway of Death” (Waller & Barry 1992, 16). 
Military ofﬁ  cers were reported to be “sickened by what they saw” (Waller 
& Barry 1992, 16). In 1993, Bosnian-Serb soldiers ﬁ  red mortar rounds 
at Bosnian soldiers playing soccer on an improvised neighborhood ﬁ  eld, 
killing and injuring civilian spectators nearby. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia found the Bosnian-Serb command-
ers guilty of harming civilians, but found no legal violation in the tar-
geting of the sporting soldiers. 
2   In 2008, Israel struck an entire group of 
Palestinian police cadets (on the theory that they were part of the Hamas 
forces), while they were marching in their graduating ceremony, killing 
scores (Colvin, Allen-Mills, & Mahnaimi 2008). The number of Taliban, 
Al Qaeda, and other insurgent groups’ members who have been killed 
by Coalition forces in Afghanistan is estimated at over 22,000. Coalition 
casualties are around 1,200.  
 Much of the criticism of how countries ﬁ  ght wars goes to the question of 
how many civilian casualties their military operations inﬂ  ict. Almost none 
goes to how many combatant casualties they inﬂ  ict. For those parties who 
engage in propaganda wars over “hearts and minds” of both domestic and 
international public opinion, the tendency is to exaggerate the number of 
one’s own civilian casualties and, correspondingly, minimize the number 
of one’s own combatant casualties. Civilian casualties are illegal, immoral, 
and unjust. Combatants, as a matter of international law, are fair game. All 
combatants are fair game. But why should this be so? This paper suggests 
that it should not be, and that the prevailing legal perspective, which accepts 
the unlimited and indiscriminate killing of soldiers, is less justiﬁ  able than 
is commonly held. 
2    Prosecutor  v.  Galic, Case No. IT-98–29-A (Nov. 30, 2006).   
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 In   Just and Unjust Wars  , Michael Walzer ([1977] 2006, 143) famously 
takes on the question of the Naked Soldier, ﬁ  rst raised by Robert Graves 
(1929) in his memoir   Good-bye to All That :  Is a soldier stripped naked and 
swimming in the lake a legitimate target during an armed conﬂ  ict? The an-
swer, says an uncomfortable Walzer, is unequivocally “yes.”  
  The existing interpretation of the laws of war supports Walzer’s con-
clusion. The principle of military necessity allows parties to a conﬂ  ict 
to use all necessary lawful force to achieve their goals. The foundational 
principle of distinction, often heralded as the humanitarian pillar of the 
laws of war, grants immunity to civilians. Together, the two principles 
sum up the tradeoff that the law seeks to induce—sacriﬁ  cing the lives 
of soldiers to protect the lives of civilians. Soldiers are allowed to kill 
enemy soldiers, with few limitations; in exchange for the right to ﬁ  ght 
and kill others, they assume the risk of being killed themselves. Civilians, 
on the other hand, must not partake in hostilities, and if they do, may be 
punished (and under some circumstances, targeted); in return for their 
abstention from ﬁ  ghting, they enjoy immunity from deliberate attack 
and must be protected to the extent possible. The laws of war are, thus, 
status-based: One is either a civilian or a combatant; once identiﬁ  ed as 
one or the other, one is subject to the privileges and obligations that the 
laws prescribe for each group. 
  The additional fundamental principles of the laws of war—namely, 
humanity (which forbids the use of means and methods of warfare that cause 
superﬂ  uous injury or unnecessary suffering) and proportionality (which 
calls for the minimization of civilian casualties)—have all been interpreted 
in ways that do not add much limitation on the right to kill enemy soldiers. 
In fact, other than some limitations on the types of weapons that can be 
employed to kill enemy combatants, the legal rules that apply to the fate of 
soldiers on the battleﬁ  eld are still much the same as they were in the nine-
teenth century. Soldiers are legitimate targets when they are asleep in their 
barracks, swimming in the lake, retreating, and probably when they are on 
leave. 
3   There is no duty to offer enemy combatants surrender or to warn 
them in advance of attack, nor is there a duty to try to apprehend them 
3     See   Yoram Dinstein (2007, 144): “As far as ordinary combatants are concerned, it must be 
perceived that they are running a   risque du métier.   They can be attacked (and killed) wherever 
they are, in and out of uniform, even when they are not on active duty. There is no prohibition 
either of opening ﬁ  re on retreating troops (who have not surrendered) or of targeting indi-
vidual combatants.”   
3
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alive. There is no difference between volunteers or conscripts, between 
those ﬁ  ghting just or unjust wars, or between those ﬁ  ghting for democratic 
or nondemocratic regimes. The only general limitation on the killing of 
enemy combatants is once the latter are rendered   hors de combat ,  through 
capture, surrender, or incapacitating injury. 
  A vast literature in both law and philosophy has been dedicated to the 
protection of civilians in war, inquiring into the rationale behind noncom-
batant immunity, the extent to which the immunity applies, its translation 
onto various theaters of war, and the conditions under which it is lost. 
Special attention has been accorded to civilians on the modern battleﬁ  eld, 
namely in wars of terrorism and insurgency, where distinguishing between 
civilians and combatants is more problematic both in terms of identiﬁ  ca-
tion (for the lack of military uniform) and in terms of the function and role 
each group plays.  
  The striking feature of the mainstream literature is its general accep-
tance (albeit at times, with some moral discomfort) of the near-absolute 
license to kill all combatants and of the law’s view of combatants as noth-
ing more than instruments of war. Moreover, although some discussions 
of the principle of distinction in the context of the war on terrorism have 
called for narrowing the scope of civilian immunity, these discussions 
have not been accompanied by any calls for correspondingly narrowing 
the scope of combatant targetability. The outcome has been that, over-
all, more individuals have become potentially susceptible to intentional 
  killing in war.  
  Only a handful of scholars, most notably philosophers Larry May 
(2007, 108–117) and more recently Asa Kasher (2009a), have challenged 
this mainstream view of the dispensable lives of soldiers. Each relying on 
his own perception of concepts of humanity, dignity, or compassion, both 
ultimately conclude that soldiers who do not pose a real threat at a cer-
tain place and time should be spared. In a discussion limited to asym-
metrical warfare, Paul Kahn (1999, 2002) suggested that where there is a 
gross asymmetry in power, war turns into a police-enforcement opera-
tion, which should focus only on the guilty/threatening, and not on others. 
Adam Roberts (2008) has suggested seeking ways to compel the enemy 
government to surrender rather than killing as many of its soldiers as pos-
sible. Recently, also, the International Committee of the Red Cross (in the 
course of a study dedicated to civilian immunity) suggested that the license 
to kill enemy combatants should be narrowed by a functional test of how 
6
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necessary this killing is (Melzer 2009, 77–82). 
4   This suggestion remains a 
nonbinding “interpretive guidance,” which, as the ICRC report itself notes, 
has been met with resistance on the part of the experts who participated in 
the study (Melzer 2009, fn. 221). 
  This article suggests that beyond any moral stance or a recommend-
ed interpretive guidance, there is a case to be made that the legitimate 
scope of combatant targetability should be narrowed as a matter of   legal 
obligation,   one that would be incorporated into the military’s rules of 
engagement.  
  The laws of war have developed with evolving moral perceptions and 
strategic geopolitical and military developments. I study the moral justi-
ﬁ  cations offered for combatant targetability, and join May and Kasher in 
challenging the enduring rationale of the class-based distinction between 
civilians and combatants. I then turn to examine the changing nature of 
wars and of combatants, questioning the strategic arguments in favor of 
maintaining combatant targetability. I argue that changes in the ways wars 
are fought and won, in the roles of soldiers in militaries, in the civilianiza-
tion of the armed forces, and in technological capabilities, cast doubt on 
the extent to which the killing of as many enemy combatants as possible 
is either necessary or sufﬁ  cient to end wars. Once the military beneﬁ  t of 
killing as many enemy soldiers as possible is diminished (even though not 
eliminated), the legal permission to do so can no longer be easily justiﬁ  ed 
under the principle of military necessity; instead, it threatens to become 
exorbitant cruelty. 
  Undoubtedly, war is about killing, and mankind has yet to imagine wars 
without death. The argument here does not engage with the question of 
whether killing in the short run preserves more lives later on. 
5   The laws 
of war restrict themselves to tactical calculations—minimizing cruelty in 
particular engagements—rather than focusing on overall calculation of the 
“body count” of the war; were it not so, any and all humanitarian limita-
tions on the conduct of war could be done away with on the theory that 
they only make war more bearable, possible, and perhaps even attractive. 
Accordingly, I limit my argument to claim that by making all killing of en-
emy soldiers “legal,” the laws of war make belligerent parties more callous 
4  The subject of combatant targetability occupies six out of over eighty pages of the report.    
5      For a discussion about the limiting rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the 
  possibility of breaking them to   preserve more lives, see Gabriella Blum (2010).   
9
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about some of the war’s human costs. 
6   If we believe that all lives have an 
afﬁ  rmative value, then limiting the permissibility of killing enemy soldiers 
is a worthy task. 
  In suggesting a possible alternative reading of the laws of war, the 
greatest challenge is one of manageability. The obvious advantage of the 
existing paradigm has been its purportedly straightforward applicability 
to the battleﬁ  eld: In reliance on a status-based rule of distinction, sol-
diers need not engage in a costly and dangerous process of ascertaining 
the merits of each individual target. Any alternative rule for permissible 
targeting that requires more ﬁ  ne-grained distinctions among combatants 
would raise the costs of decision-making, training, and monitoring of 
compliance. These increased costs would have to be weighed against the 
value of human lives.  
  Moreover, given the changing nature of the battleﬁ   eld, the current 
class-based paradigm itself is becoming increasingly dependent on case-
by-case judgments. The reality of a mixed combatant-civilian population 
within and outside the battleﬁ  eld, coupled with a growing humanitarian 
conscience that is sensitive to civilian casualties, already requires states to 
invest in military technologies that enable them to tell combatants apart 
from civilians and target the former without harming the latter. To do this, 
they must often engage in individual-based determinations of the identity 
and role of their target. Here we have a logical basis for the same action for 
the opposite purpose: These same capabilities that are currently used to 
comply with the distinction between civilians and combatants can be put to 
use to tell threatening combatants apart from unthreatening ones.  
  With these considerations in mind, the last part of the paper offers two 
amendments to the current doctrine of targeting combatants: The ﬁ  rst is 
based on a more ﬁ  ne-grained application of the principle of distinction, 
suggesting that as a mirror-image to the presumption of civilian immuni-
ty, which is lost when the civilian takes a direct part in hostilities, the pre-
sumption about soldiers’ targetability will be similarly rebuttable where a 
soldier poses no threat. The second suggests a re-reading of the principle 
of military necessity to incorporate a least-harmful-means test, mandating 
the capture or otherwise disabling of the enemy rather than direct target-
ing, wherever feasible. I discuss the challenges of applying these amend-
ments on the battleﬁ  eld and the possible legal strategies of adopting them. 
6      On the numbing effects of the legal discourse of IHL norms, see David Kennedy (2006).   
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Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to adopt these amendments 
must rest on the value we want to assign human lives, particularly those of 
enemy combatants. 
  The focus in this paper is on the combatant side of the principle of 
  distinction, as complementing the existing scholarship that already ad-
dresses civilian immunity. I therefore largely ignore the implications of the 
  argument for noncombatant immunity, although I intend the suggestions 
of limiting combatant targetability as a corollary—rather than a threat  —to 
civilian immunity.  
  The article proceeds as follows. Part 2 offers an overview of the general 
principles of the laws of war, as they pertain to the permissible target-
ing of combatants on the battleﬁ  eld. Part 3 summarizes the mainstream 
philosophical justiﬁ  cations for subjecting combatants to deliberate tar-
geting and the dissenters’ voices in challenging them. Part 4 ﬂ  eshes out 
three fundamental strategic changes in the nature of wars and combat-
ants, namely the declining value in killing generic combatants in modern 
conﬂ  icts, the civilianization of the armed forces, and the technological 
sophistication of at least some militaries. In Part 5, I propose possible 
alternative doctrines, which aim at limiting the legitimate targeting of 
combatants. I discuss the practical implications of this amended reading 
and the   possible legal strategies for bringing it about.  
  2. SOLDIERS—THE VIEW FROM THE LAWS OF WAR 
  Throughout the ages, ﬁ  ghting on behalf of one’s country/state/nation has 
been a concept synonymous with honor, masculinity, and patriotism. 
7   In 
Athens, military service was a duty and a privilege reserved for and in-
cumbent upon citizens of the polis, distinguishing them from slaves or for-
eigners. In medieval times, the status of knighthood was reserved for the 
nobility (from the young age of seven), whereas footsoldiers were serfs and 
criminals. Only the nobility had a right to bear arms. It was for this reason 
that the use of the crossbow (which allowed a commoner to strike a noble-
man from afar—thereby bypassing the chivalric code of combat) was pro-
hibited (Strickland 1996, 72). 
8    
7      On the relationship among soldiers, chivalry, and masculinity, see generally Leo Braudy (2005).   
8      The prohibition, which later applied to wars among Christians, but not with “inﬁ  dels,” was 
never adhered to.   
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  With the development of the nation state, beginning in the ﬁ  fteenth 
century but gaining greater force in the seventeenth century, volunteers (and 
mercenaries) were replaced with national standing armies. The Napoleonic 
wars saw mass recruits of poorly armed, poorly trained, and ill-equipped 
soldiers, who were sent to charge attacks by constituting a human wave, 
ultimately earning the label of “cannon fodder” (De Chateaubriand 1814). 
The development of modern national armies required reformulating the 
laws of war, from derivatives of notions of honor and chivalry—which be-
ﬁ  tted battles fought by privileged classes—to rules based on reciprocity and 
professionalism that could be generalized for mass armed forces. Military 
dress, although known in some form or another as early as the Spanish 
infantry of Hannibal and the Spartan hoplites, became more uniform and 
standardized, distinguishing soldiers from civilians.  
  Laws and customs of warfare once again became preoccupied with how 
armies fought each other, largely neglecting the Enlightenment era’s concern 
for the well-being of civilians until after World War II. The religious-based 
justiﬁ  cations for restraint in war gave way to more secular, utilitarian prohibi-
tions that corresponded to geopolitical and technological changes affecting 
military strategies and capabilities. Some new rules were driven by lingering 
remnants of medieval notions of honor and fairness on the battleﬁ  eld (ban-
ning treacherous killing or masquerading as the other side’s combatants), and 
others by the wish to reinforce the principle of distinction and protect civil-
ians (prohibiting the practice of shielding or disguising oneself as a civilian). 
Speciﬁ  cally negotiated agreements further banned some types of weapons be-
lieved to cause unnecessary suffering (dum-dum bullets or poisonous gas).  
  None of these limitations, however, with the exception of the rules per-
taining to   hors de combat   (on which I elaborate further later in the article), 
concerned the  right  to kill all enemy combatants; they only constrained  how 
  one could exercise that right by prohibiting certain means and methods of 
warfare. 
9  In effect, the rules pertaining to the permissible killing of combat-
ants have remained much as they were in the nineteenth century. 
  The four basic principles of the laws of war, or as they are also known—
international humanitarian law (IHL), are military necessity and humanity, 
distinction, and proportionality. In what follows, I expand on how the ex-
isting understanding of these principles allows for the permissible targeting 
of all combatants.  
9     See supra   discussion in section 1.1.   
18
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  2.1. Military Necessity and Humanity 
 As introduced into the Lieber Code of 1863 at the beginning of the American 
Civil  War   
10— the  ﬁ  rst modern codiﬁ  cation of the laws of war—the principle 
of military necessity was at once both an enabling and a limiting concept. It 
allowed the use of “those measures that are indispensable for securing the 
ends of the war and that are lawful according to the modern law and usages 
of war.” 
11   In Lieber’s time, these measures included “  all direct destruction of 
life and limb of armed enemies  , and of other persons whose destruction is 
incidentally unavoidable… it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, 
and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of particular 
danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property and obstruc-
tion of the ways and channels of trafﬁ  c, travel, or communication, and of all 
withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy….” 
12   But along-
side this comprehensive list of “Do’s,” military necessity had a more implied 
“Don’t”: It “does not admit of cruelty.” 
13   This meant that destruction and 
pain that were not strictly “necessary” for securing the war’s ends were imper-
missible. This limiting feature has sometimes been framed under a separate 
principle of humanity, according to which the means and methods of warfare 
that cause superﬂ  uous injury and unnecessary suffering are proscribed. 
14    
  Five years after the Lieber Code, the principles of military necessity 
and humanity were codiﬁ  ed within the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. 
15  
Negotiated among military ofﬁ  cials from the various powers, the Declaration 
sought to “[ﬁ  x] the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to 
yield to the requirements of humanity,” 
16   and stated that “the only legiti-
mate object which States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy; that for this purpose it is sufﬁ  cient 
to   disable the greatest possible number of men .” 
17    
10      Lieber Code, General Orders No. 100 (U.S. Adjutant General’s Ofﬁ  ce 1863).    
11     Id.   Art.  14.  
12     Id.   Art. 15 (italics added).   
13     Id.   Art.  16.  
14     See  Hague Regulations Art. 22, annexed to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1907, Hague Regu-
lations]: “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not   unlimited.”    
15      Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, Nov. 29/
Dec. 11, 1868 [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].   
16     Id.     
17     Id.   (emphasis added).    
22
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  The century and a half that separates us from the St. Petersburg 
Declaration saw little change in the understanding of the principles of mil-
itary necessity and humanity. 
18   The 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations and 
the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Conventions added and codiﬁ  ed rules on   hors 
de combat   (on which I elaborate later in the article) and on permissible 
tactics of war, while other subsequent conventions (such as the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention) stipulated prohibitions on spe-
ciﬁ  c types of weapons that cause superﬂ  uous injury and unnecessary suf-
fering. On the whole, however, the enabling features of “military necessity,” 
as far as soldiers are concerned, have taken precedence over any limiting 
components.  
  In its present-day formulation, the principle of military necessity ac-
cordingly permits “only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise pro-
hibited by the law of armed conﬂ  ict, that is required in order to achieve the 
legitimate purpose of the conﬂ  ict, namely  the complete or partial submission 
of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure 
of life and resources  ” (UK Ministry of Defence 2004). 
19   “Necessity”  thus 
justiﬁ  es not only what is required to win the war, but also what reduces 
the risks of losses or costs of the war. 
20   As the ICRC itself recognizes in its 
Interpretive Guidance, “Apart from the prohibition or restriction of certain 
means and methods of warfare, however, the speciﬁ  c provisions of IHL 
do not expressly regulate the kind and degree of force permissible against 
legitimate military targets” (Melzer 2009, 78).  
  This statement is compatible with the instructions given by militaries to 
the armed forces on the battleﬁ  eld. The U.S. Army Field Manual, for instance, 
accepts, as a general matter, that, “The law of war places limits on employ-
ing any kind or degree of violence that is not actually necessary for military 
purposes” (U.S. Dept. of the Army 2003), but in its operational section, it in-
structs that “Wartime ROE [Rules of Engagement—G.B.] permit U.S. forces 
18    As the ICRC concedes, “Historically, the modern concept of military necessity has been strong-
ly inﬂ  uenced by the deﬁ  nition provided in Art. 14 of the Lieber Code” (Melzer 2009, fn. 215).   
19     See also   U.S. Dept. of the Army (1956), U.S. Dept. of the Navy (2007), & NATO (2009).   
20     See also the decision by the American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in the “Hostage Case,” 
proclaiming that “Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply 
any amount and kind of force to compel, the complete submission of the enemy with the least 
possible expenditure of time, life, and money.” USA v. List et al., 11 NMT 1230, 1253  (American 
Military Tribunals, Nuremberg, 1948).   
24
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to open ﬁ  re upon all identiﬁ  ed enemy targets, regardless of whether those 
targets represent actual, immediate threats” (U.S. Dept. of the Army 2000). 
21  
  2.1.1. The “Hors de combat” Exception 
  The broadest exception to the general right to kill enemy combatants is the 
category of combatants who are   hors de combat   (in French, “outside the 
ﬁ  ght”)—those who have been rendered incapable of ﬁ  ghting, through sur-
render, capture, or injury.  
  Some rules prescribing certain behavior toward the injured, captured, 
or dead have been part of the laws of war since their earliest incarnation. 
22  
Motivated by religious dictates and codes of honor and chivalry, such rules 
regulated the payment of ransom in exchange for release of POWs, the duty 
to allow the enemy to collect its dead and bring them to burial, and so on. 
  First formally codiﬁ  ed in the Lieber Code, rules on   hors de combat  were 
subsequently elaborated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Protocols of 1977. These 
negotiated treaties included prohibitions on the denial of quarter (mean-
ing, refusing to accept an offer to surrender), 
23   on harming those who have 
surrendered, 
24   and on mistreating POWs. 
25   The treaties further instructed 
that those who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked be safeguarded from vio-
lence, treated humanely, and cared for. 
26  
21      The Manual then proceeds to instruct that once a threat has been declared a hostile force, U.S. 
units and individual soldiers may engage without observing a hostile act or demonstration of 
hostile intent. The basis for engagement becomes   status   rather than   conduct .  
22      For a general history of the laws of war, see Stephen Neff (2005) & Geoffrey Best (1983).   
23     See  Hague Regulations Art. 23(g); Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conﬂ  icts (Protocol I) 
Art. 40, Jun. 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API].   
24      Hague Regulations Art. 23(g); API Art. 41.    
25     See   Chapter II of the Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, Jul 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague Convention of 1899]; Chapter II of the 
Hague Convention of 1907, and Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [Geneva Convention III, hereinafter GCIII]. The Additional 
Protocol from 1977 expanded the entitlement to POW status but did not add much to the 
rights of POWs.    
26    Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field Art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [Geneva Convention I, hereinafter 
GCI]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea Art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[Geneva Convention II, hereinafter GCII].    
27
28
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  The rules about   hors de combat   all share one underlying principle: Once 
soldiers are incapacitated—through surrender, capture, or injury—they no 
longer pose a threat. As the ICRC commentary to the Geneva Convention 
explains, “it is only the soldier who is himself seeking to kill who may be 
killed. The abandonment of all aggressiveness should put an end to aggres-
sion” (Pictet 1952, 136). All soldiers who are not injured or captured are 
presumed to be “seeking to kill,” and therefore the deliberate targeting of 
all enemy combatants—regardless of their role on the battleﬁ  eld, whether 
they are off duty, asleep in the barracks, bathing in the lake, or retreating—
is permissible. 
27   There is no duty to warn enemy combatants prior to an 
attack, to try to capture enemy combatants as POWs instead of killing them 
(a duty that existed under the medieval codes of knightly conduct in re-
spect to other knights) (Stacey 1994, 30), to injure them instead of killing 
them, or in any other way minimize combatant casualties.  
  An interesting historical anomaly is the rule prohibiting shooting at air-
crew parachuting in distress (as opposed to shooting at parachuting sol-
diers in deployment) (Pilloud et al. 1987, 495). 
28   This constraint was borne 
out of the early admiration of pilots: During World War I, “The adversary 
who had been brought down in ﬂ  ames was entitled, not to bullets, but to 
a salute as he went down, to wishes for his recovery if he were wounded, 
and ﬂ  owers if he were dead” (Pilloud et al. 1987, 494). Although this provi-
sion could be understood as being akin to the protections accorded to ship-
wrecked seamen who were   hors de combat  , it was probably more inspired 
by notions of chivalry (aircraft being the new “steed,” ﬁ  t for gallant knights 
alone, and air-ﬁ  ghts being the new “tournaments”), as the bailing aircrew 
were protected even when they parachuted back into their own territory 
and were able to resume their combat activity shortly thereafter (Pilloud 
et al. 1987, 494–496). 
  In sum, the exception of   hors de combat   is the only manner by which the 
class-based distinction is supplemented by a threat-based analysis. In the 
following sections, I argue that this threat-based analysis can and should be 
expanded beyond this exception. 
27     See   W. Hayes Parks (1989): “Combatants are liable to attack at any time or place, regardless of 
their activity when attacked… An individual combatant’s vulnerability to lawful targeting (as 
opposed to assassination) is not dependent upon his or her military duties, or proximity to 
combat as such.”   
28      API Art. 42. Although the provision in API was a new one, several military manuals contained 
a similar provision.   
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 2.2.  Distinction 
  Described as “cardinal” by the International Court of Justice, the principle 
of distinction is the foundation of much of the current laws of war: “remove 
the ‘principle of distinction’ and the entire IHL system collapses” (Dinstein 
2007, 146). Together with the principle of military necessity, it makes up the 
“deal” that IHL strikes between the need for war and for killing in war and 
the humanitarian concern for those affected by wars: It allows the sacriﬁ  ce 
of combatants and military objects in exchange for sparing civilians and 
their property.  
 The exact scope of the principle of distinction has been the center of cen-
turies’ long religious, philosophical, and legal debate over Just War theory. 
In the ﬁ  fth century, Augustine’s justiﬁ  cation for war as a just and even lov-
ing punishment for the wrongdoing of the enemy allowed the killing of all 
enemy nationals, civilians and combatants alike. The dependency of the 
justness of killing on the justness of war remained the predominant view 
throughout the following centuries (rearticulated by Averroes, Thomas 
Aquinas, and Francisco de Vitoria). 
29   It was only in the seventeenth century 
that Hugo Grotius, followed a century later by Emmerich de Vattel, and 
relying on a secular conception of natural law, insisted on separating the 
justness of the cause of war from the justness of the means of prosecuting 
the war. Accordingly, the fate of people could no longer depend on whether 
their country should be “punished,” but instead on whether they played a 
role in ﬁ  ghting. This was not only a secular move, but also a strategic one; 
for once the knightly model of war was replaced with mass armies and 
mercenaries, the ability to ascribe “guilt” to individual soldiers, even those 
ﬁ  ghting unjust wars, was further diminished. Both these notions—the in-
dependence of the   jus in bello   from the   jus ad bellum,   and the sparing of all 
those who do not partake in hostilities—are at the foundation of modern 
laws of war.  
  The present-day principle of distinction, which is both customary and 
treaty-based, has two dimensions: One applies to people, the other—which 
requires a more ﬁ  ne-grained judgment in application—to objects.  
  2.2.1. The Distinction Between Civilians and Combatants  
  The human aspect of the principle of distinction is status-based: One is 
either a “civilian” or a “combatant,” with a set of distinct protections and 
29      For the intellectual history of the notion of civilian immunity, see Colm McKeogh (2007).   
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obligations that is attached to each. This seemingly neat division between 
the two categories, however, is subject to much debate.  
 IHL’s  deﬁ  nition of “civilians” is a residual one and comprises all those 
who do not fall under the category of combatants. 
30   In cases of doubt, an 
individual must be presumed to be a civilian. Civilians are not allowed to 
take part in hostilities, and in exchange for their nonparticipation, they are 
entitled to immunity from any deliberate attack (even if not from uninten-
tional harm). Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I, 1977 (“API”) sums up 
this principle when it ensures immunity to civilians “unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” 
31   If a civilian takes a direct part 
in hostilities, he turns into a de facto combatant for   purposes of targeting; 
but unlike the privileged combatant, he may also be tried and punished for 
the mere participation in the war effort. The exact scope of civilian immu-
nity thus hinges upon the deﬁ  nition of “combatants” (civilians being de-
ﬁ  ned in a residual manner) as well as on the interpretation of Article 51(3) 
(the   conditions under which a civilian turns into a combatant). 
  The terms “combatants,” “belligerents,” and “members of the armed 
forces” are used interchangeably, while the term “soldier” is nowhere used 
or deﬁ  ned in the basic documents on the laws of war. Article 43(2) of API 
stipulates that “The armed forces of a Party to a conﬂ  ict consist of all orga-
nized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command respon-
sible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates….” It then proceeds 
to stipulate that “Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conﬂ  ict other 
than medical personnel and chaplains … are combatants, that is to say, 
they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.” The right to partici-
pate in hostilities means that, unlike civilians who take part in the ﬁ  ghting, 
  combatants break no law by merely participating in combat, so long as they 
follow the laws of war. On the battleﬁ  eld, they may kill enemy soldiers, with 
few limitations; if captured, they may not be tried or punished for doing so, 
unless they have also committed war crimes. They may only be subject to 
detention by enemy forces as POWs.  
  Hence, although in the ordinary meaning, “combatant” is a per-
son who ﬁ  ghts, in the legal sense, “combatant” is anyone who has a 
30    API  Art.  50.  
31      API Art. 51(3). On the interpretation of Art. 51(3), see HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel [2005] (not yet published), available at: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf (Barak’s opinion).   
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right to ﬁ  ght under international law, and this right is accorded to all 
members of the armed forces, other than medical personnel and chap-
lains. Another exceptional category is soldiers assigned exclusively to 
civil defense tasks. 
32   All three—medics, chaplains, and civil defense forces—
must wear a distinctive emblem to identify them as such. Other than 
these categories, all soldiers are targetable unless they become   hors de 
combat  , and it is irrelevant if they are conscripted or volunteers, serving 
on the frontline or in the rear,   engaging in combat, combat-support, or 
 noncombat  activities. 
  An earlier distinction between members of the armed forces who are 
combatants and those who are not, which appeared in Article 3 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations, was considered and expressly rejected during the 
  negotiations of the 1977 API. The ICRC’s commentary on API states: 
  In fact, in any army there are numerous important categories of soldiers 
whose foremost or normal task has little to do with ﬁ  ring weapons. These 
include auxiliary services, administrative services, the military legal service 
and others. Whether they actually engage in ﬁ  ring weapons is not impor-
tant. They are entitled to do so, which does not apply to either medical or 
religious personnel, despite their status as members of the armed forces, or 
to civilians, as they are not members of the armed forces. All members of 
the armed forces are combatants, and only members of the armed forces are 
combatants (Pilloud et al. 1987, 515). 
 The claim that “all members of the armed forces are combatants” is general-
ly undisputed. There are heated debates, however, about the status of those 
who are not members of national armed forces, namely irregular forces. 
Without elaborating on its scope and background, the dispute is essentially 
over a question that is pivotal to the modern battleﬁ  eld: Should nonstate 
paramilitary forces who do not distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population be considered lawful combatants, unlawful combatants, or else 
civilians who take part in hostilities? 
33   This controversy has reemerged with 
full force with the advent of the “war on terror,” and the need to classify ter-
rorists as either combatants (lawful or unlawful) or civilians for purposes 
32    API  Art.  61(a).  
33      On the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants generally, see Dinstein (2007, 
150–156) and cf. Marco Sassòli (2006); Nathaniel Berman (2004). For the view that unlawful 
combatants are essentially civilians, see Michael Schmitt (2008).   
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of targeting or detention. 
34   I return to the implications of this controversy 
later in the paper.  
  2.2.2. The Distinction Between Civilian and Military Objects 
  Article 52(1) of API expresses the obligation to distinguish in targeting 
between military and civilian objects. As in the case of human beings, the 
deﬁ  nition of civilian objects is residual and encompasses all nonmilitary 
objectives. Unlike the case of human beings, however, the deﬁ  nition of 
military targets is not one of status but of function. Article 52(2) of API 
states that “military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
  nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to mili-
tary action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutraliza-
tion, in the   circumstances ruling at the time, offers a deﬁ  nite military 
advantage.” 
35  
  There are thus striking differences between the rules on the permis-
sible targeting of individuals and the permissible targeting of objects: 
Although any member of the armed forces is presumed to be contributing 
to military action so that his or her killing is presumed to gain a deﬁ  nite 
military advantage, objects must stand a case-by-case test of contribution 
and advantage to justify their destruction, capture, or neutralization. 
36  
Speciﬁ  cally, the Protocol makes no distinction between “military objects” 
and dual-use objects, which would have followed the distinction between 
military personnel and civilians who may or may not serve military func-
tions; instead, it treats all objects as potentially dual-use. Thus, a tank 
exhibited at the Smithsonian is not a legitimate target, but an exhibition-
guide soldier is. 
  This difference in targeting standards might be justiﬁ  ed on the account 
that there is often more time to assess the nature of an immovable target 
than the identity of moving human beings. But this is not always the case, 
nor does the Protocol limit the obligation to engage in case-by-case evalua-
tions to instances where the assessment can be made at leisure.  
34      On the debates surrounding the status of Al Qaeda or Taliban members, see generally Ryan 
Goodman (2009); Derek Jinks & David Sloss (2004); Joseph Bialke (2004); Kenneth Anderson 
(2002).  
35    Other  speciﬁ  c provisions accord special protection to cultural objects and places of worship 
(Art. 53), objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (Art. 54), the natural 
environment (Art. 55), or works and installations containing dangerous forces (Art. 56).    
36      For an elaborate and illuminating analysis of legitimate military objectives, see Parks (2007).    
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 2.3.  Proportionality 
 The principle of proportionality signiﬁ  es the distinction between the delib-
erate killing of civilians (or attacking civilian objects), which is always pro-
hibited, and the realization that no war can be fought without inadvertently 
  affecting the innocent. Following the Catholic doctrine of double effect, 
which distinguishes between intended and foreseen consequences, it allows 
for the foreseen-yet-unintended killing of civilians (or damage to civilian 
objects), provided that such “collateral harm” is not excessive in relation to the 
overall military advantage that is to be gained from the attack. The principle of 
proportionality further mandates that combatants take all feasible precautions 
to minimize collateral harm that might result from their military actions. 
  The principle of proportionality in   jus in bello   has never been interpret-
ed, nor does its language suggest that it should be interpreted, as applying 
to enemy combatants. There is thus no duty to minimize harm to enemy 
combatants. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Law, which 
lists all indictable war crimes, makes no reference to an excessive killing of 
combatants. 
37   In fact, the killing of more enemy combatants has been gen-
erally understood as a central component of “military advantage,” against 
which harm to civilians must be measured. 
  Some commentators have linked the excessive killing of combatants in 
war to the necessity and proportionality requirements of the just use of force 
under the  jus ad bellum  prong of the laws of war. There are debates in the lit-
erature on whether the necessity and proportionality requirements of the  jus 
ad bellum   apply to any act in war or govern only the initial use of force, or in 
other words, whether they apply tactically, strategically, or even politically. 
38  
It is unnecessary here to chime in on this debate; for even to those advocat-
ing the law’s most expansive reading, these requirements have not been read 
as prohibiting the killing of all enemy combatants in the course of legitimate 
military operations under the   jus in bello  . Nor do military manuals seem to 
support such a reading in instructing their troops on the laws of war.  
  2.4. A Note on International Human Rights Law 
  There has been a noticeable effort among human rights activists to com-
plement and interpret IHL norms with or in light of the more expansive 
37     See   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Art. 8, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.   
38     Cf.   Christopher Greenwood (2000) (arguing that the   jus ad bellum   requirements must be kept 
separate from the   jus in bello )   with   Paul Christopher (2004).    
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and protective norms of international human rights law (IHRL). This 
  humanitarian drive has been promoted, in part, by the existence of judicial 
institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, which have ju-
risdiction over IHRL claims but not IHL ones. 
39   A recent context in which 
this effort has been particularly evident is the “war on terror” and the de-
bates over the standards that should apply to the targeting and treatment 
of   terrorists. 
40    
  And still, the human rights community, advocates and scholars alike, 
has remained fairly silent in discussions of the right to life of a country’s 
  own   military forces (discussions that have taken place among political 
theorists). 
41   Particularly, it has failed to advance principled claims about 
the obligations owed by the government to its own soldiers or comment on 
the legitimacy of the interstate consensus around the sacriﬁ  ce by govern-
ments of some portion of their domestic population (for example, soldiers) 
for the beneﬁ  t of the rest (for example, civilians).  
  True, governments try to protect their soldiers, partly by employing 
more aggressive force toward the enemy (including by “risk-transfer” 
from soldiers onto enemy forces and civilians). But the terms of engage-
ment, as far as the soldiers are concerned, are that death on the battleﬁ  eld 
is not only an occupational hazard, but also something the government 
has agreed to in advance as lawful and legitimate. This makes soldiers’ 
terms of engagement conceptually different from the occupational haz-
ards of police ofﬁ  cers, ﬁ  re ﬁ  ghters, or any other public servant: Not only 
do they undertake risk, in   effect, they are expected to forfeit their right to 
life (Kasher 2009a, 10). 
  3. SOLDIERS—THE VIEW FROM PHILOSOPHY 
  Philosophers have paid far more attention to combatant targetability than their 
colleagues in the legal profession have. And even though the present-day 
39     See, e.g.,   Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H. R. Rep. 847 (2005) (applying right-to-
life analysis to Russian military strikes in Chechnya); Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751 
(applying a similar analysis to a clash between Turkish forces and members of the Workers 
Party of Kurdistan). Note, however, that in these cases, the state in question itself denied that 
the context was one of an armed conﬂ  ict, thus denying the application of IHL altogether. For 
a discussion of these cases, see William Abresch (2005).   
40     See generally   Anderson  (2007)  and   Natasha Balendra (2008).   
41     See, e.g.  , Thomas Hill Green (1895).   
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philosophical literature that offers justiﬁ  cations for killing in war might still 
be preoccupied mainly with the non-killing of noncombatants (with some 
notable exceptions that I reference later), it is within this scholarship that 
some doubts concerning the legitimate scope of targeting combatants—
doubts that are largely absent from legal scholarship—are voiced.  
  Three strands of modern justiﬁ  cations for killing in war stand out, and 
I group them roughly in three categories: immunity theory, honor theory, 
and convention. I note those criticizing these justiﬁ  cations as well as those 
questioning their implications with regard to the permissible killing of sol-
diers. These critiques are later used in Part 5 of the paper to support my 
own normative argument. 
  3.1. Immunity Theory  
  The most common strand of justiﬁ  cation for killing in war largely relies 
on the paradigm of self-defense and is forwarded by those who have been 
dubbed “immunity theorists.” 
42   Early versions of the immunity theory 
hark back to earlier versions of Just War theory and the coupling of the 
just cause of war with its just prosecution. For Elizabeth Anscombe (1970), 
combatants are targetable when they pose a threat and are engaged in “an 
objectively unjust proceeding.” Some contemporary writers, such as Jeff 
McMahan (2006), Paul Ramsey (1968), and Robert Holmes (1989) 
43   follow 
in Anscombe’s footsteps and reject the principle of the “moral equality” 
of soldiers by which the status of combatants ﬁ  ghting just wars is equal to 
those ﬁ  ghting on behalf of unjust aggressors.  
  An obvious problem with this position—one that ﬁ  rst drove Grotius in 
the seventeenth century to argue for a separation of the   jus ad bellum  from 
the   jus in bello  —is the lack of arbitrator to determine which wars are just 
and which are not. Almost all parties who engage in war believe they are 
ﬁ  ghting for just causes; if the justice of the cause cannot be easily deter-
mined, there could be no practical beneﬁ  t from a system that purports to 
impose limitations on the “unjust” party alone. Another difﬁ  culty is the 
assumption of collective guilt on the part of all soldiers or the collective 
innocence of all civilians and the inevitable realization that some civilians 
(e.g., the informed farmer who supports Nazi propaganda) would always 
42      The term was offered by George Mavrodes (1975) and then followed by others, such as Robert 
Fullinwider (1975).
43     See also   Daniel Zupan (2004).   
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be more morally culpable than some of their naïve and uneducated com-
patriot   soldiers (Mavrodes 1975, 81).  
  It is for this reason that most contemporary immunity theorists, such as 
Thomas Nagel (1972) or Fullinwider (1975), follow present-day IHL and 
reject notions of morality and guilt as a basis for determining targetabil-
ity. They juxtapose “innocence” not with “guilt,” but with “threat” or “dan-
ger,” and justify the targeting of soldiers under the principle of self-defense. 
Being innocent (that is, unthreatening), the civilian is immune from attack, 
while the dangerous soldier is susceptible to it. 
44  
  But even if “innocence” is juxtaposed with “danger,” and not with “guilt,” 
the collective determination that all civilians are unthreatening and all sol-
diers are threatening is an uneasy one. Questioning the scope of civilian 
immunity that could be justiﬁ  ed on the basis of the self-defense paradigm, 
Lawrence Alexander (1976, 415) concludes that “the intentional killing of in-
nocent noncombatants is not necessarily immoral … [because] the right to 
kill in self-defense requires only that the person killed be a necessary or suf-
ﬁ  cient cause of a danger, not that he be morally guilty.” C. A. J. Coady (2008, 
154) expands the groups of civilians who might be targeted on the basis of 
“threat” to include “the political leadership of an unjust war, civilian scien-
tists developing weapon systems for that enterprise, civilian conspirators who 
have successfully plotted to bring about the war for their own purposes, and 
so on,” acknowledging that his stance allows the targeting of more civilians 
than the laws of war currently allow. And Michael Green (1992, 43) goes even 
further to argue that civilian innocence is a relic of the past, when “the people 
had no part to play in legitimizing, commanding, or controlling the activi-
ties of the government.” Such is not the case today, because “war became a 
conﬂ  ict among nations and peoples involving the total mobilization of those 
nations” (Green 1992, 43). His assertions are especially resounding if one 
considers the claim that democratic accountability improves the war perfor-
mance of the country. 
45   Although emphasizing the growing responsibility of 
the   civilians in society, Green stops short of challenging the corresponding 
assumption about the “threat” or “culpability” of all combatants.  
44     See Fullinwider (1975), explaining that “the distinction between combatants and noncomba-
tants derives from the operation of the Principle of Self-Defense. Our obligation not to kill 
noncombatants stems from our obligation not to kill without justiﬁ  cation; and the Principle 
of Self-Defense justiﬁ  es killing only combatants.” For a similar argument, see also John Ford 
(1970).  
45     See   Samuel Issacharoff (2009).   
55
56Spring, 2010: Volume 2, Number 1  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  89  
  Some accounts for why all soldiers should be considered threatening are 
offered by other immunity theorists, who rely on the collective nature of 
war and on the role of soldiers as agents of their country. Walzer ([1977] 
2006, 138) argues that war cannot be fought without discriminating be-
tween ﬁ  ghters and nonﬁ  ghters, where the former “are subject to attack at 
any time.” 
46   The reason for this, he claims, is that the soldier has allowed 
himself “to be made into a dangerous man” (Walzer [1977] 2006, 145). 
Acknowledging that not every soldier is dangerous at every time, and that 
simple soldiers are not necessarily “responsible” for their government’s 
actions,   
47   he believes the   class   of soldiers is dangerous, and this fact is what 
distinguishes any individual soldier from all civilians. Noam Zohar further 
develops this notion to create what he terms “extended self defense,” which 
accounts for the killing of soldiers who are neither directly responsible for 
their government’s actions nor threatening at a particular moment: “War 
is perceived and described properly only when we see it as being waged 
between nations rather than simply between two hosts of individual 
soldiers…. Civilians too are members of the nation, but their identity as 
individuals is paramount whereas those who wear the national uniform are 
rightly identiﬁ  ed as embodying the nation’s agency” (Zohar 2004, 739).  
  This class-oriented variation of immunity theory thus allows for a uni-
form treatment of all soldiers, regardless of their immediate role, function, 
or the degree of threat they pose. They are denied any individual identity, 
and are instead considered all to be members of a group, which the state 
sends to kill and be killed on its behalf, so that a larger group—namely, 
civilians—can be protected.  
  The obvious problem with the class-based theory is its circularity: We 
designate soldiers as agents of the state, and once designated as such, they 
are targetable. But why should   only   soldiers be agents of the state? Why 
46    See also Coady (2004) and Noam Zohar (1993, 615), who emphasizes that killing in war cannot 
be justiﬁ  ed by direct analogy to self-defense on the private level: “Where the basic analogy to 
self-defense does function is on the collective level, justifying self-defensive war itself despite 
its necessary cost in innocent lives”; and Uwe Steinhoff (2007, 54), who argues that it is not 
so much the actual non-innocence or innocence of any individual target as much as it is what the 
attacker   can know   with some degree of certainty about the individual that should underlie 
the distinction doctrine. In this, Steinhoff’s emphasis seems to be on the administrability of 
the moral rule more than on its application in each particular case.   
47      Walzer ([1977] 2006, 28) does distinguish between conscripted soldiers and volunteers. He de-
scribes his disagreement with Thomas Hill Green (1895) over his own proposition that “no wrong 
is done in war if ‘the persons killed are voluntary combatants.’” As he notes, Green questions the 
degree to which soldiers actually volunteer to go to battle, as opposed to serving a state action.    
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should   all   soldiers be agents of the state? Taken to extreme, why should 
the class theory not revert back to Augustine’s punitive model of the ﬁ  fth 
century that collapsed any distinction between the king and his subjects? 
These questions are especially pertinent as most class theorists also share 
a strong commitment to democracy. One could easily make an argument, 
as Michael Green (1992, 43) does, that voting (and perhaps nonvoting) 
citizens in a democracy should be considered as responsible as any soldier 
for their government’s actions. 
48    
  Immunity discussions at times express some uneasiness about the tar-
geting of all enemy combatants under all circumstances. Alexander (1976, 
413) emphasizes that some combatants might be less dangerous and con-
tribute less immediately to the war effort than their civilian compatriots. 
49  
Thomas Nagel (1972, 140) is willing to admit that not all those in uniform 
are necessarily threatening. And Coady (2008, 164) concludes that “there 
should be a presumption that warriors are entitled to direct lethal force 
against opposing warriors where they have some plausible warrant for see-
ing them as wrongdoers or attackers … the presumption is much weaker, 
even rebuttable, in cases where the enemy troops are palpably in the right, 
or offer no serious threat.” 
50   None of these discussions, however, elaborates 
on the limitations pertaining to the killing of enemy combatants or on 
their practical implications, at times merely noting that such limitations 
would be “an indictment of widely accepted norms of warfare” (Alexander 
1976, 413). 
48      Green (1992, 43) writes, “In a perfect democracy each and every person would be … fully 
responsible, because if the method of consent has been in operation, each has agreed to the 
decision reached by that method, or, if not that, to be bound by whatever decision was reached 
by that method.” A similar argument has been advanced by Igor Primoratz (2002).   
49      Alexander’s conclusion, nonetheless, focuses on expanding the permissible targeting of civil-
ians without a corollary contraction of the permissible targeting of combatants.   
50      Earlier in his chapter, Coady (2008, 157) adds: “there are wrong ways to treat enemy troops, 
some of which are covered by the proportionality requirement of the JIB [  jus in bellum –  G.B . ]. 
When we know that enemy troops are demoralized and ready to surrender, then further pros-
ecution of lethal attacks upon them is surely showing disrespect for human life and for the 
humanity in them speciﬁ  cally, your entitlement to injure and kill them is restricted by its 
necessity for furthering the war aims that are legitimated by your just cause, and when at-
tacks upon them are no longer required by those aims, then the normal respect for human 
life should resume and be exhibited in your conduct.” It is unclear whether the just cause is 
the determining factor in weighing the legitimacy of the decision to continue to ﬁ  ght, or the 
state of the enemy troops. In any case, Coady’s claim that this issue is covered by the “propor-
tionality requirement of the JIB” is inaccurate.    
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  3.2. Honor Theory 
  Another strand of justiﬁ  cation for noncombatant immunity (and thus, by 
extension, for combatant targetability) relies on medieval notions of hon-
or and dignity. Nagel (1972, 134) employs the distinction between “ﬁ  ght-
ing fair” and “ﬁ  ghting dirty” to explain why killing enemy combatants is 
compatible with treating them as human beings, whereas killing civilians 
is not. Henry Shue (1978, 129) has argued that preserving the principle 
of noncombatant immunity “allows for a ‘fair ﬁ  ght’ by means of protect-
ing the utterly defenseless from assault.” Under the honor theory, civilian 
immunity is not a matter of innocence from either moral culpability or 
threat, but instead of the ability to participate in a fair and honorable ﬁ  ght. 
Present-day reliance on notions of honor is reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes’s 
rejection of unnecessary violence or cruelty in war: “though there be in war no 
law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are those laws, the breach whereof 
is dishonour. In one word, therefore, the only law of actions in war is honour; 
and the right of war providence” (Hobbes [1640] 1999, 104). Why it should 
be honorable to kill   all   soldiers, regardless of their role or their actual ability 
to participate in a “fair ﬁ  ght,” however, remains unanswered.  
  Paul Kahn’s (2002, 1999) ideal of fair ﬁ  ghting is more nuanced, prohib-
iting not only the killing of civilians, but also the killing of combatants 
who are substantially inferior in power. For Kahn (2002, 3), addressing 
asymmetrical warfare, the right of combatants to kill one another depends 
on some rough notions of equality of power, as a reciprocal claim of self-
defense can exist only “as long as they stand in a relationship of mutual risk.” 
Asymmetric war is “an image of warfare without the possibility of chiv-
alry” (Kahn 2002, 4). Without mutual risk, war is not war anymore, but a 
policing action; “The moral condition of policing, however, is that only the 
morally guilty should suffer physical injury. There might be exceptions to 
this rule, but there is no wholesale license to target the morally innocent” 
(Kahn 2002, 4). Kahn, however, does not extend his argument to all theaters 
of war; in essence, his challenge is not so much of the right to kill soldiers in 
war, but of labeling asymmetrical conﬂ  icts as “wars” in the ﬁ  rst place.  
 3.3.  Convention 
  A third strand of theory denies any moral content to the principle of distinc-
tion and views it, instead, as a mere convention that states have agreed upon 
in regulating their warfare. The preeminent advocate of this theory, George 
Mavrodes (1975), argues that this convention is intended to limit the 
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destructive effects of wars in some readily applicable way, but cannot be jus-
tiﬁ  ed on any inherently moral grounds, any more than a convention about 
driving on either the left- or right-hand side of the road can be. 
51   For Ma-
vrodes, the sacriﬁ  ce of soldiers for the beneﬁ  t of civilians is essentially an 
extension of the dueling idea: If we could resolve all conﬂ  icts by a single duel, 
fought by one volunteer from each side, then that would undoubtedly be the 
best compromise between the ideal of paciﬁ  sm and the resigned acceptance 
of the necessity of war. But because the single duel is a utopia unlikely to be 
accepted by warring rivals, a different convention—one of armies ﬁ  ghting 
one another—has been adopted. Mavrodes is ready to concede that if an alter-
native convention, one capable of further reducing the harmful effects of war, 
is adopted, then there is no essential moral superiority to the current one. 
  Mavrodes’s arguments can be formulated in the following manner: The 
principle of distinction is useful only to the degree it approximates, in the best 
possible way, the values we want to promote in regulating warfare, namely 
recognizing the need to allow parties to prosecute wars, including by killing 
some individuals, while protecting to the extent possible other individuals.  
 3.4.  Critiques 
  But does the current status-based principle best approximate these values? 
At least two philosophers argue that it does not. The ﬁ  rst is Larry May, who 
accepts the general self-defense paradigm but objects to its rigid status-
based application, not only as it pertains to civilian immunity but also as 
applied to combatant targetability.  
  Like others before him, May (2007) begins by rejecting the application of 
a simplistic distinction between combatants and civilians on the basis of the 
threat they pose (“most soldiers never ﬁ  re a shot”). Consequently, it becomes 
questionable to what degree status-based or class-based   distinctions between 
“combatants” and “civilians” are useful in informing targeting decisions: 
  What is at stake here is whether social group categories should be used 
as absolute rules that are in themselves sufﬁ  cient for action decisions, or 
whether the group categories are merely guides that inform but do not de-
termine our actions (May 2007, 115). 
  The stakes are heightened when one embraces, as May does, considerations 
of humanity and human compassion, even where the lives of one’s enemies 
51    For  similar  arguments,  see Michael Green (1992) and Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez (2000).   
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are concerned. These considerations dictate that the permissible killing of 
combatants in war is merely a rebuttable presumption, which must be test-
ed on a case-by-case basis. In any particular case, testing the presumption 
requires a real consideration of the value of human life, so that intentional 
killing is only justiﬁ  ed by the threat emanating from the individual target 
under the prevailing circumstances. The just or unjust cause that combat-
ants ﬁ  ght for is irrelevant in May’s analysis, which thus ensures the integrity 
of the   jus in bello   as independent from the   jus ad bellum . 
  May’s ally in challenging the status-based distinction is Israeli philosopher 
Asa Kasher, who attacks the existing principle of distinction as violative of 
soldiers’ human dignity. Kasher emphasizes the value of all human life, in-
cluding that of enemy combatants, and ﬁ  nds that the license to kill all enemy 
combatants without further justiﬁ  cation other than a presumption of dan-
gerousness pays insufﬁ  cient heed to this value. In consideration of the lives of 
a state’s own soldiers, he advances an argument about the state’s obligations 
to its own citizens—civilians and soldiers—thereby questioning the norma-
tive acceptability of an interstate agreement that permits the killing of all sol-
diers (Kasher 2009b, 55–86). Like May, he ultimately demands ﬁ  ner-grained 
distinctions that would spare the unthreatening combatant (Kasher 2009a).  
  For both philosophers, the move away from status-based distinctions to 
individual-based determination has the simultaneous effect of sparing more 
soldiers and endangering more civilians. The naked soldier, who under exist-
ing IHL is a legitimate target, is saved, while the munitions factory owner, who 
is currently probably immune from deliberate attack, loses that immunity.  
  In the following sections of this paper, I join the critics and explain why 
the current understandings of the principle of distinction, as well as of 
the principle of military necessity, no longer serve as best approximates 
of the values that IHL seeks to promote. Following the moral intuitions of 
those who challenge the status-based orientation of the targeting doctrines, 
I work within the existing legal frameworks to show how the status test 
should be complemented by a functional test. I employ a positive analysis 
of the changing nature of wars and warfare to make a normative argument 
about the effects these changes should have on the reading of the laws of 
war. My attempt is to show that even without demanding that warring 
parties demonstrate compassion toward each other, there are reasons to 
question whether modern warfare still warrants an interpretation of the 
principle of military necessity as justifying the killing of as many combat-
ants as possible.  
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  4. SOLDIERS—THE VIEW FROM THE BATTLEFIELD 
  The laws of war have always been a creature of their time, shaping and 
evolving in correspondence to geopolitical developments, technological 
  innovation, and changing social and cultural preferences. 
52  
  It is beyond the boundaries of this present work to elaborate at great 
length on the historical evolution of the changing nature of wars since the 
nineteenth century and the early formulations of the principle of military 
necessity in  jus in bello . However, certain crucial differences in how wars are 
fought and won are relatively straightforward and obvious, notwithstand-
ing the many similarities that persist.  
  Of these differences, three major developments can be identiﬁ  ed: The 
ﬁ  rst is a declining importance of the “generic combatant,” which calls into 
question the understanding of “military necessity” as justifying killing as 
many enemy soldiers as possible. The second is a growing civilianization of 
the armed forces, which calls into question the rationale and applicability 
of the traditional principle of distinction. And third is the development of 
new technologies that allow for greater discrimination in targeting, which 
suggests the possibility of revising the existing targeting doctrines in ways 
that would require more ﬁ  ne-grained distinctions.  
  4.1. The Declining Importance of the “Generic Combatant” 
  Ancient, medieval, and early modern wars were fought over territory and 
domination. To conquer a territory and control it effectively, the military was 
essential. And to defend territory, harming as many enemy soldiers as pos-
sible was the most effective strategy. Modern wars may be still fought over 
territory and domination even though the acquisition of territory through 
war is outlawed, but combatants play a declining role in winning them. Mili-
tary power, itself, is diminishing in its decisive ability to determine the fate of 
disputes. As one expert put it, “tactical supremacy alone is unlikely to achieve 
national strategic objectives except in the most  particularized of cases” (Cun-
ningham 2008, 116). In fact, a decisive victory can no longer be achieved 
through total submission of the enemy, in terms of its capacity to ﬁ  ght or 
threaten. In this reality, economic power, access to resources, infrastructure, 
international alliances and institutions, and domestic and international 
52    For the effects of the changes in political structures, economy, and technology on the laws of war, 
see the various contribution in Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos, & Mark Shulman, eds. 
(1994) and Philip Bobbitt (2002).   
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public opinion have become as, if not more, crucial to national strategic goals 
generally and the war effort particularly (Smith 2005). This is especially true 
in nontraditional military-to-military international armed conﬂ  icts, where 
the ability of military power alone to bring about victory is even more doubt-
ful than in the traditional conﬂ  icts (Kaldor 2006). See the American defeat in 
Vietnam, France’s in Algeria, Israel’s in Lebanon, the Soviets’ in Afghanistan, 
or the survival of Al Qaeda or the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army.  
  This point should not be overstated. I do not mean to suggest that mili-
tary power is inconsequential in determining the outcome of wars, nor that 
economic power or access to resources were unimportant two hundred or 
two thousand years ago. The claim I make is much more modest, but impor-
tant nonetheless. Of the entire set of factors that contribute to “victory,” the 
weight of military power is declining in comparison with previous eras.  
  The second reason for the declining importance of combatants is the prog-
ress of technology on the battleﬁ  eld (and I return to other implications of this 
development later in the article). In advanced militaries, there is no “gener-
ic” soldier; instead, soldiers contribute in vastly different proportions to the 
war effort: Some ﬂ  y airplanes or command tanks, while others serve in laun-
dry facilities—killing “as many as possible” is less important than disabling 
the more dangerous ones. Again, although there was clear differentiation in 
roles and importance between the infantry, cavalry, artillery, or the Marins of 
Napoleon’s Grande Armée, and between all of those and support units, killing 
as many of the enemy’s soldiers in the Napoleonic era would have increased 
one’s chances of victory by an overwhelming margin (which might explain 
the 3.5–6.5 million military casualties of the Napoleonic wars) (Elting 1988; 
Fremont-Barnes & Fisher 2004). Today, this margin is much smaller. 
53    
  Consider, for instance, long-term sieges on cities and states that in past 
times were intended to cut off the inhabitants from any supply that would 
help them maintain their resistance. Such sieges required the deployment 
53     See also   Michael Schmitt (2008, 24–25): “With forces facing each other across a FEBA (forward 
edge of the battle area), the immediate objective of warfare was to weaken the enemy suf-
ﬁ  ciently to allow one's own forces to seize territory. You wore the enemy down through attri-
tion warfare, the serial destruction of its military… . Today, battleﬁ  elds are multi-dimensional, 
i.e., technology has evolved to the point where the concept of a line marking the heart of the 
battle (with combat fading the greater the distance from that line) no longer makes sense. 
There may be ground forces facing each other, but the conﬂ  ict is everywhere. Consider Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom (OIF)…. Indeed, the ﬁ  rst blow of the war was not the crossing of the Iraqi 
border by an invasion force, but rather an attack by Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117s 
designed to kill Saddam Hussein.”    
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of mass armies to enforce them. But today, they can be replaced by control 
from the air or the sea, or by cyber attacks on economic and utilities infra-
structure, of the kind employed by Russia to dismantle the Georgian bank-
ing and utilities systems during their 2008 war (Sanger, Markoff, & Shanker 
2009, A1). It is hardly surprising that the U.S. military now identiﬁ  es cyber 
warfare as a major threat to national security. 
54   For these types of action, as 
well as to defend against them, a mass army is not useful or necessary, and 
consequently, nor is the killing of as many enemy soldiers as possible.  
  Sheer numbers of enemy casualties might nonetheless have an indi-
rect contribution to the war effort in terms of garnering and maintaining 
domestic support. Recent decades have seen the birth and growth of an in-
ternational “humanitarian conscience” (or “universal benevolence”), which 
comprises various trends, including a growing general aversion to war, a lower 
tolerance for civilian casualties (Gat 2009, Rogers 2000), 
55   and an increased 
care for the well-being of others, including enemy nationals. But this trend, 
to the extent it exists, does not include, as of yet, a general aversion to enemy 
combatant casualties. In fact, in 2004, U.S. military spokespersons began re-
porting the number of enemy deaths in Iraq (a practice that had been aban-
doned after Vietnam) in an effort to “frame” the casualties of coalition forces. 
The intuition was that the Western public would perceive the war effort more 
positively if the ratio of coalition deaths to enemy deaths was low; a controlled 
study subsequently conﬁ  rmed this intuition (Boettcher & Cobb 2006). 
  The effects of killing enemy combatants on garnering domestic support 
for the war or weakening the morale of the enemy might suggest that kill-
ing as many enemy soldiers as possible is in fact still   necessary  . But the term 
“necessary” here is probably closer to “convenient” or “beneﬁ  cial” than it is 
to “crucial” or “vital.” If generic enemy combatants are less useful as a war 
machine, killing them is less necessary to win the war. It might be “neces-
sary” only indirectly, to garner domestic support or diminish the enemy’s 
morale. Whether we allow the killing of people because it has a positive effect 
on domestic support or a negative effect on the enemy’s morale is ultimately 
54      As the U.S. general in charge of network warfare put it, “Maintaining freedom of action in 
cyberspace in the 21st Century is as inherent to U.S. interests as freedom of the seas was in the 
19th Century, and access to air and space in the 20th Century” (Keith Alexander 2009).    
55      Naturally, civilian casualties are more tolerated where there is a perception that national in-
terests are at stake. Of course, there are those who claim that this humanitarian conscience is 
detrimental as well as dangerous to the U.S. (and Western) interests.   See, e.g.  , Robert Mandel 
(2006).  
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a normative judgment. The laws of war certainly ban other practices that 
might have had a negative effect on the enemy’s morale (such as torture of 
POWs, the killing of civilians, the use of chemical weapons, and so on). 
 Moreover, the correlation between killing enemy combatants and greater 
domestic support or diminishing enemy morale is, in itself, a product of 
how we construct the battleﬁ  eld. Because we allow the killing of as many 
enemy combatants as possible, and only as many combatants as possible, the 
measurement of (lawful) success is tied to the number of combatants killed. 
One could imagine, however, that under a different normative construction 
of the rules, one that would limit the lawful killing of combatants to that 
which is directly “necessary,” the excessive killing of combatants would be 
tantamount to other practices that are banned under the laws of war, which 
might only outrage the enemy and domestic audiences to weaken the at-
tacking forces. Domestic support, particularly, is tied to its perception of 
lawful and unlawful behavior, a fact evident from negative popular domes-
tic sentiments about civilian casualties on the enemy’s side.  
  To sum up this part, if the role of military power alone in determining 
political outcomes is indeed declining, and the degree of contribution to 
the military power by some individual combatants is minuscule, then the 
formulation of the principle of “military necessity” as allowing belligerent 
parties to “disable the greatest possible number of men” 
56   might be less 
apt today than in the St. Petersburg Declaration days. A much narrower 
formulation—one that only allows killing that is clearly necessary to achieve 
the war’s aims—is in order. If so, the ICRC’s submission that “in classic large-
scale confrontations between well-equipped and organized armed forces or 
groups, the principles of military necessity and of humanity are unlikely to 
restrict the use of force against legitimate military targets beyond what is 
already required by speciﬁ  c provisions of IHL” is a correct assertion of the 
law but unwarranted as a normative matter (Melzer 2009, 80).  
  Moreover, and perhaps more disturbing from a humanitarian perspective, 
many civilian functions—political, ﬁ  nancial, infrastructure—have become 
more central to the war effort than military functions; maintaining the 
 ﬁ ction of a status-based distinction between combatants and civilians be-
comes increasingly difﬁ  cult to justify on any functional basis. This point is 
reinforced by the development discussed next. 
56      St. Petersburg Declaration,   supra   note 15.   
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  4.2. Civilianization of the Armed Forces 
  The changing nature of wars has been accompanied by a change in the 
nature of the armed forces ﬁ  ghting them, and in particular, the greater in-
tertwining of combatants and civilians. Although this point has often been 
made with regard to insurgents or other nonstate forces, it is no less true 
for modern standing armies as well. This development poses obvious chal-
lenges to the principle of distinction, both conceptually and practically.  
  Armed forces were always dependent on civilians for their function. 
Civilians ran the politics, drove the economy, and provided the support 
needed for the armed forces to function. It is largely for this reason, prac-
tical rather than ethical, that in ancient times, by and large, peasants and 
civilian property were kept alive, as conquerors knew they were dependent 
on the crops and labor that civilians produced once the war was over. This 
is not to say that cases of wholesale slaughter and acts of wanton cruelty did 
not occur—only that they were not the rule.  
  The limited necessity of killing civilians helped deﬁ  ne and maintain a 
principle of distinction from the beginning. It allowed war to be construct-
ed as a phenomenon of combat between soldiers, who were distinguishable 
from civilians. Once war was established that way and accepted in such 
form by the pool of potential adversaries, the need to target civilians fur-
ther diminished. Military necessity and distinction were thus two facets of 
the way sovereigns designed the battleﬁ  eld.  
  Over the past several decades, however, the process of civilianizing the 
army has become more and more pronounced. The change is not merely 
a matter of degree: It involves blurring the geographical lines of front and 
rear, reshufﬂ  ing roles and functions, and reallocating risk. It is in part for 
this reason (in addition to sheer cruelty or revenge) that the ratio of civil-
ian to combatant deaths has been on the rise since the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  
  The civilianization of the American military has been a growing trend 
in recent conﬂ  icts. In Vietnam, the ratio between civilian contractors and 
uniformed military personnel was 1:5; in Desert Storm, it plunged to 1:100; 
but in Bosnia, it rose to 1:1. In Iraq today, the ratio is 1:1, and at some points 
in time, it was even higher on the contractors’ side (Grier 2008; Manero 
2007, 5). The greater reliance on civilians is driven by considerations of 
efﬁ  ciency (over the long run, the costs of contractors are lower than of em-
ploying soldiers (U.S. Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce 2008)) as well as a wish 
to decrease the public uneasiness about the number of troops deployed to 
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war zones (on the assumption that the public is more sensitive to   casualties 
among the armed forces than among contractors) (Avant & Sigelman 
2008, 34–37).  
  Within the U.S. military, a growing number of military positions are now 
performed by civilians employed by the military, including billeting, logisti-
cal support, meteorological monitoring, and healthcare. Civilian contractors 
in Afghanistan and Iraq increasingly perform a variety of roles that had tra-
ditionally been thought of as exclusively military, including security detail, 
prisoners watch, and weapons systems analysis. Outside a few exceptions, 
it has become virtually impossible to guess who performs which tasks: The 
Army Corps of Engineers is building bridges in Afghanistan, while civilian 
contractors are in charge of the engineers’ security. 
57  And, as one military of-
ﬁ  cer observed, “[g]iven the current operational environment, military sup-
port personnel and their civilian counterparts are as vulnerable, if not more 
so, to attacks than combat units on patrol” (Lindemann 2007, 84). These 
developments have posed increasing challenges for the principle of distinc-
tion, both practically and conceptually: The degree of military threat that an 
individual poses no longer correlates with whether she is in uniform or not. 
In fact, militaries could choose to outsource all noncombat operations to ci-
vilian contractors, just as they could choose to outsource combat operations 
to civilian contractors (notwithstanding the question of how these contrac-
tors would be treated if captured on the battleﬁ  eld).  
 Alongside the civilianization of the standing militaries of western countries, 
the role of nonstate actors as participants on the battleﬁ  eld has increased 
dramatically. Among these actors, the blurring lines between civilians and 
combatants are even more structural, given the integration with and reli-
ance on the civilian population by the insurgents. This integration is in 
part a result of and reaction to the IHL principle of distinction. By accord-
ing civilians greater protection on the battleﬁ  eld, the principle encourages 
the insurgents to assume the posture of civilians (a moral hazard prob-
lem). Moreover, distinguishing among individuals as either combatants 
or civilians is a difﬁ  cult task when it comes to nonstate actors, not only 
because the latter generally do not wear uniforms or maintain distinctive 
emblems, but because functionally, insurgents are often combatants only 
57  See, for example,      a government solicitation of contractors to perform security opera-
tions for the Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan, available at   https://www.fbo.gov/
index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=a4fbfe10d60af9c7b7378b3062e3b5ab&_
cview=1&cck=1&au=&ck.     
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“part time.” In addition, political leadership and military commanders are 
more closely intertwined in nonstate groups than in national structures, 
not only in purely military factions, such as Al Qaeda, but also in armed 
groups with national political aspirations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or the 
former IRA.  
  All of these have posed a signiﬁ  cant challenge for countries ﬁ  ghting in-
surgents, terrorists, or other nonstate actors. Naturally, the civilianization of 
national militaries poses similar problems for the principle of distinction, 
even if the trend is driven by other considerations; indeed, it is somewhat 
ironic that countries’ efforts to expand the exceptions to civilian immu-
nity in the context of counterinsurgency take place just as these countries 
expand their own militaries’ reliance on civilians. For present purposes, 
however, I want to focus on the recent debates surrounding the targeting 
and detention of nonstate actors, particularly terrorists, because they dem-
onstrate an important shift in the application of the principle of distinc-
tion. They also offer a better case study for the current application of the 
principle of distinction, because as a generalization, militaries (particularly, 
western militaries) exhibit greater commitment to follow the principle of 
distinction than insurgents or terrorists do.  
  Terrorists are classiﬁ  ed as either combatants (lawful or unlawful) or as 
civilians who are taking direct part in hostilities. 
58  On the traditional battle-
ﬁ  eld, this distinction would have made a great difference for purposes of 
permissible targeting, because combatants might be targeted at any time, 
in any place, for any role they play, while civilians might only be targeted 
“for such time” that they take a “direct” part in hostilities. As applied to the 
context of the “war on terrorism,” however, this distinction proved to be 
much less signiﬁ  cant, because it was replaced, instead, by a functional test 
of “threat” or “guilt” (with the distinction between “threat” and “guilt” not 
being consistently preserved).  
  In 2005, the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ), when reviewing the 
government’s policy of targeted killings of terrorists in Gaza and the West 
Bank, classiﬁ  ed terrorists as civilians taking direct part in hostilities. 
59   It  or-
dered that terrorists be targeted only when there was sufﬁ  cient intelligence 
58     See supra   notes 33–34.    
59      HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel 
[2005] (not yet published), available at: http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/
A34/02007690.A34.pdf.  
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to show that the individual targeted was directly, substantially, and continu-
ously involved in terrorism—a standard that would have been unnecessary 
had members of paramilitary groups been labeled “combatants.” Still, when 
interpreting the limitation “for such time,” the HCJ rejected the possibility 
of a “revolving door” allowing a terrorist to act as a terrorist by day and a 
civilian by night, substantially weakening the temporal constraint. In effect, 
the Court allowed the government to target terrorists any time, any place, as 
long as the “guilt” of the terrorist has been established. In other words, the 
functional test of the nature of the target made the distinction in labeling 
the individual a “civilian” or a “combatant” less meaningful. 
  Unlike its Israeli counterpart, the American Supreme Court was ready to 
accept the U.S. government’s position that terrorists should be classiﬁ  ed as 
combatants, speciﬁ  cally unlawful combatants. 
60   The question of when and 
how terrorists might be targeted has never been addressed. But from the dis-
cussions of their permissible detention, a similar functionality test can be 
noticed. 
  In March 2009, the U.S. government stated its position on the detention 
of terrorists in its submission in the  Re Guantanamo  case. 
61  The submission 
argues for an expansion of the criteria for detaining suspected terrorists be-
yond members of Al Qaeda or the Taliban, to include “associated forces that 
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, 
including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly 
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.” 
62   In determining 
who “directly supported hostilities,” the submission proceeds to argue: 
   It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the 
 abstract, the precise nature and degree of “substantial support,” or the precise 
characteristics of “associated forces,” that are or would be sufﬁ  cient to bring 
persons and organizations within the foregoing framework….   Accordingly, 
the contours of the “substantial support” and “associated forces” bases of 
detention will need to be further developed in their application to concrete 
facts in individual cases. 
63  
60     Hamdi v. Rumsfeld  , 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (relying on   Ex parte Quirin  , 317 U.S. 28, 30 
(1942)).    
61    Resp’ts’ Mem. (Misc. No. 08–442), In Re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, D.D.C.,  available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.    
62     Id.   at 2.   
63     Id.   
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  Although the submission was careful to limit itself to the question of 
  detention, the case-by-case assessment of the conduct of particular 
  individuals might carry important implications for targeting as well.  
  Moreover, the American counterinsurgency doctrine orders command-
ers to distinguish between “reconcilable” and “irreconcilable” insurgents 
for targeting purposes, so that even among those who are   prima facie  tar-
getable, those who might be susceptible for reconciliation are to be spared: 
“We must strive to make reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we 
identify, pursue, and kill, capture or drive out the irreconcilables” (MNF-I 
Guidelines, reprinted in Ricks 2009, 369).  
  To sum up, there are at least three aspects to the civilianization of the 
armed forces: ﬁ  rst, that the growing enmeshing of civilians within both 
national and subnational military groups renders the status-based princi-
ple of distinction conceptually more difﬁ  cult to defend and pragmatically 
more difﬁ  cult to follow. Second, in the context of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency, distinction (at least as it is interpreted by some gov-
ernments and courts) already seems to move away from status-based clas-
siﬁ  cations of status toward a determination of individual “guilt.” In this 
sense, the human aspect of the principle of distinction is becoming more 
similar to the object aspect, which requires a case-by-case determination 
of the contribution of the intended target to the military effort. 
64  The third 
aspect is that this move from class-based to guilt-based determinations 
presumes an ability to make such individual determinations, which is the 
subject of the next section. After these determinations are possible, the jus-
tiﬁ  cation for maintaining group-based decisions about targeting   further 
diminishes. 
65    
  4.3. Modern Technologies 
 When governments undertake to engage in a case-by-case determination of 
the involvement of particular individuals in hostile activity, they must  believe 
that they can do so. What makes it possible for military or other security forces 
to engage in such determinations and act upon them? More than anything else, 
it is the development and deployment of sophisticated  intelligence-gathering 
64     See supra   note 34.   
65      I ignore for present purposes the rejection of the principle of civilian immunity on the part 
of insurgents and terrorists, under a purportedly similar rationale. For the most part, this is a 
disingenuous claim, and in any case, it is hardly ever accompanied by individual-based distinc-
tions but rather by indiscriminate attacks on populations, regardless of their role or function.   
95
96
97
98Spring, 2010: Volume 2, Number 1  ~  Journal of Legal Analysis  ~  103  
and targeting technologies. While the human   component of military intel-
ligence remains as important as ever, the contributions of signal and visual 
intelligence to military decision-making are continuously increasing. The 
introduction of more intrusive and less visible technologies enables bet-
ter remote-gathering and analysis of information in real time. Operational 
advances in communication, speedy deployment, and precision ﬁ  re enable 
a more direct and immediate targeting.  
  All this advancement does not amount to perfect distinction in target-
ing; inadvertent civilian casualties are still abundant due to errors, miscal-
culation, malfunctioning, or mere indifference. Nor is modern technology 
omnipotent (Bin Laden is still at large). But the technology enables forces 
who care about minimizing civilian casualties to do so to some degree, even 
in theaters that make such distinctions highly complex, by identifying and 
ﬁ  ring at only those directly involved in hostile activity. The same technolo-
gy that is currently used to tell civilians apart from combatants, and hostile 
civilians apart from the innocent, can be employed to distinguish among 
members of the armed forces to target only those who pose a real or im-
mediate threat. 
  The technological revolution on the battleﬁ  eld also makes for a grow-
ing disparity of power between warring parties on the modern battleﬁ  eld. 
Although such disparities have always shaped the geopolitical map of the 
world (recall Athens’ invasion of Melos), the gaps in military power and 
capabilities are growing, and with them the gaps in risk assumption on 
the battleﬁ  eld. Technological advances enable combatants to strike targets 
from miles away and high above, exposing themselves to little or no risk 
of counterattack. Often, the target is unaware of the looming attack and is 
given no opportunity to surrender. A greater reliance on unmanned instru-
ments (drones, robots, and the like) further diminishes the risks for those 
employing them. 
66    
  Asymmetries in power invite questions about fairness in war. Recall 
Kahn’s (2002) point about the unfairness of killing all combatants in grossly 
asymmetric wars. Fairness becomes a particularly hard issue when one con-
siders the implications of the greater reliance on unmanned instruments: 
The fact that our machines are killing human beings on our behalf makes 
the dehumanization of soldiers even more striking. If there was ever an 
66      Peter Singer (2009) reports that there currently are more than 5,300 drones in the U.S. inven-
tory and about another 12,000 on the ground.   
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element of fairness, of a “boxing match”-kind logic, it has been entirely lost 
once robots are doing the boxing for us. 
67  
  But even without inquiring about the underlying fairness of the current 
system, these developments do shed a different light on the application of 
the principle of military necessity on the battleﬁ  eld. For powers that enjoy 
a substantial qualitative and quantitative advantage, it becomes more fea-
sible and less risky to invest time and resources in determining the speciﬁ  c 
nature of targeted individuals. Leaders and commanders can be told apart 
from the rank and ﬁ  le, the highly trained pilots from the militarily insig-
niﬁ  cant cook, the armed from the unarmed, and so on. If so, it becomes less 
necessary to target all enemy combatants in the name of speedy victory and 
preservation of resources. 
  This argument does suggest that powers with greater capabilities might 
be held to stricter standards in complying with the laws of war. Although 
the normative legitimacy of a differentiated scale of compliance might be 
debated, as a positive matter, such differentiation already exists with re-
gard to the protection of civilians. Weaker military or paramilitary forces 
already have every incentive, at times strategic, at other times ideological, 
to violate the laws of war. Stronger militaries with better technologies and 
more discriminatory capabilities are often expected by the international 
legal and humanitarian community to employ better precautions in con-
ducting attacks and to minimize civilian casualties, under the intuition that 
“can” implies “ought” (Anderson 2009). For instance, in consideration of 
the rule prescribing taking precautions in attack to minimize civilian casu-
alties, the more advanced militaries are expected to employ more discrimi-
natory weapons (“smart bombs” and the like), even though these weapons 
are more expensive than ordinary munitions. As a matter of principle, then, 
“can” may imply “ought” with regard to enemy combatants’ lives as well. 
  5. AN ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE  
  The advantages of the current doctrines of military necessity and distinc-
tion lie in their purportedly straightforward application on the battleﬁ  eld. 
67      For a similar argument, see Kahn (2002, 3): “A regime capable of targeting and destroying 
others with the push of a button, with no human intervention but only the operation of the 
ultimate high tech weapon, propels us well beyond the ethics of warfare. Such a deployment of 
force may be morally justiﬁ  ed—it might be used to promote morally appropriate ends—but 
we cannot appeal to the morality of warfare to justify this mode of combat.”   
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The current doctrines that permit the targeting of (almost) all combatants 
and ensure the immunity of (almost) all civilians allow military forces to 
make multiple determinations in a quick and self-protective manner, for 
simpler training of soldiers who ultimately have to apply the rule on the 
battleﬁ  eld, and for more straightforward monitoring of compliance after 
the fact. 
68  To the degree these doctrines suffer from some elements of moral 
arbitrariness, a similar challenge could probably be raised against any alter-
native framework. 
  And still, given that human lives are at stake, there is reason to question 
whether the administrability of the current doctrines justiﬁ  es the degree 
of their arbitrariness. This is particularly so since the application of the 
given doctrines on the modern battleﬁ  eld is not as straightforward as the 
rules imply. Several classes of combatants are already exempt from target-
ing. These include the   hors de combat  , military chaplains, medical units, 
and civil defense forces. Civilians lose their immunity when they take direct 
part in hostilities. On the modern battleﬁ  eld, which is often geographically 
undeﬁ  ned and where civilians and combatants coexist, attacking forces al-
ready have their work cut out for them: They must try to distinguish civil-
ians from combatants (even where neither group wears uniforms), actively 
hostile civilians—a combined test of fact and judgment—from bystanders, 
and objects the disabling of which would contribute to the military effort 
from those that should be spared; they must also aim their weapons in a 
way that minimizes collateral harm to those immune. In other words, the 
nature of the modern battleﬁ  eld both already calls for and enables an 
application of the principle of distinction in a way that departs from the 
crude combatant/civilian status-based distinction without prohibitively 
impairing the value of military necessity. More nuanced targeting decisions 
already require a substantial investment at the stage of application, limiting 
the advantage of the current rule-like doctrines over a more complex stan-
dard that would place further limits on the targeting of combatants. 
69  
  The problem of administrability of an amended targeting doctrine is 
nonetheless intertwined with several related difﬁ  culties. The ﬁ  rst is that any 
change in the doctrine of distinction, especially one that narrows opportu-
nities for targeting, is likely to raise the costs of lawful combat and of realizing 
68      On the importance of clear guidance to soldiers on the battleﬁ  eld, see Martha Minow (2007).      
69    Here I follow Louis Kaplow’s (1992, 560) distinction between rules and standards as “ the extent 
to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individual acts .”  
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the interest of military necessity, even beyond what the current complica-
tions of the modern battleﬁ  eld call for. It would require some additional 
investment in intelligence gathering, target identiﬁ  cation, precision ﬁ  re, 
and even pretargeting legal advice. 
70   Second, a standard of targeting that 
relies on capabilities would apply differently to more advanced militar-
ies than to the less sophisticated ones, potentially causing a moral hazard 
problem (such as avoiding investment in more discriminating technolo-
gies and weapons). Third, by its very nature, the realization of the standard 
would take different forms in different theaters of war. Fourth, regardless 
of a differentiated application depending on military capabilities or theater 
of war, the standard is likely to be followed by some while intentionally ig-
nored by others. Fifth, the greater indeterminacy of a standard makes post-
hoc assessments—and particularly, potential criminal enforcement—less 
determinate too. This leads to the sixth problem, of the indeterminacy of 
a standard opening up opportunities for legal and political exploitation in 
the form of “lawfare,” propaganda, and the like. 
  None of these problems should be dismissed or underestimated. But 
there are also mitigating aspects that should be pointed out: Conceptually, 
an amended standard would not be different from other limitations im-
posed by the rules of IHL, such as prohibitions on certain types of weap-
ons or the need to spare civilians, which all add to the costs of lawful war. 
Adding further to these costs through a more complex targeting doctrine 
would be no different from agreeing on any other humanitarian constraint, 
beyond what the current law prescribes. Given that modern war-power al-
lows the armed forces to be much more destructive at relatively lower costs 
than before, adding constraints to this destructive power is not unreason-
able. Moreover, in consideration of the declining role of military power in 
determining the outcome of international disputes, constraints on the kill-
ing of enemy combatants might in fact create more incentives for warring 
parties to turn to alternative methods of resolving the conﬂ  ict (negotiations, 
adjudication, economic incentives, and so on). 
  The prediction about asymmetrical compliance should similarly not 
serve as either a normative or a prescriptive block. Asymmetry is already 
prevalent with regard to the existing norm of distinction, as well as to other 
humanitarian rules of war—some forces comply with them, some ignore 
70     See Kaplow (1992, 563, 571–572), noting that legal advice in the case of standards is more 
costly than in the case of rules.    
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them, and some manipulate them to their own advantage. Already, some 
militaries are held to higher standards of compliance by the media, public 
opinion, or international monitoring bodies than others, based on their 
capabilities. The moral hazard problem that exists today as a result of the 
status-based distinction doctrine will in all likelihood be replicated in dif-
ferent forms once the doctrine is amended; no doubt, parties that would 
seriously accept a more reﬁ  ned and complex legal targeting scheme might 
ﬁ  nd themselves further disadvantaged by asymmetrical compliance. But, 
as in raising the costs of lawful war, concerns about asymmetrical compli-
ance are present whenever any improvement of humanitarian protections 
is contemplated.  
 I nonetheless acknowledge that these mitigating factors might not be fully 
responsive to all the concerns noted earlier with regard to amending the tar-
geting doctrine. Consequently, if and when the suggested amendments be-
come impossible to apply without signiﬁ  cantly raising the risk or costs to a 
party’s ability to effectively prosecute its war, they would have to be forgone 
or reformed, as previous rules in the past have been. Ultimately, the decision 
whether to pursue them or not must rely on the value we want to assign the 
lives of human beings, including those of our enemies.  
  For these reasons, the proposals set forth are suggestive, rather than con-
clusive, intended more as examples of how we should rethink the existing 
paradigms on targeting combatants. In the face of uncertainty with regard 
to the operation of the proposed amendments, and given the unlikelihood 
of a broad political agreement over their adoption, a more phased and lim-
ited approach should be considered. Thus, there is a possibility for some 
armed forces to adopt a more restrictive targeting scheme as a unilateral self-
imposed constraint (much in the same way that some military doctrines—
such as the revised U.S. military Counter-Insurgency Manual—call for more 
restrictive targeting schemes for the sake of safeguarding civilians, beyond 
what the laws of war mandate). In fact, if the call to demonstrate concern for 
enemy combatants has any traction, it is under the assumption that some 
armed forces can afford to absorb a certain degree of risk in exchange for 
caring for the enemy. It is also possible that moral, cultural, and aesthetic 
sensibilities would drive other militaries—although certainly not all ﬁ  ght-
ing forces—to adopt similar doctrines. Whether or not these self-imposed 
restrictive doctrines would ultimately evolve into a binding legal norm is 
difﬁ  cult to predict, and would probably depend on whether the changes in 
warfare earlier identiﬁ  ed continue to characterize the modern battleﬁ  eld.  
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  In what follows, then, I offer several possible modiﬁ  cations of the existing 
doctrines, which might be complementary to one another, and which strive 
to limit the terms and conditions of targeting enemy combatants. My focus is 
on the combatants’ side of the equation of the principle of distinction, leaving 
aside the question of civilian immunity; this is so because civilian immunity 
is already at the center of moral, political, and legal debates about war, while 
the fate of combatants is marginalized. As I have noted in the introduction, 
it is possible to adopt these modiﬁ  ed targeting schemes as complementary to 
the doctrine of civilian immunity, rather than as threats to it, with the out-
come of reducing the direct targeting of human beings overall. 
  5.1. From Status-Based to Threat-Based Determination: Rereading “Distinction” 
 The ﬁ  rst alternative framework calls for the relaxation of the status-based de-
termination by supplementing it with an obligation to assess the individual 
threat emanating from any particular human target. This would require an 
amendment to the principle of distinction, from one separating combatants 
from civilians to one distinguishing threatening combatants from unthreat-
ening ones. It is particularly striking that such a case-by-case determination 
is called for, in principle, for military objects but not for human beings. 
71    
  This amendment would essentially operate as the mirror-image of the 
doctrine of civilian immunity: Civilians are presumed innocent and im-
mune unless and for such time as they take direct part in hostilities.
72 The 
proposed change would make combatants presumptively dangerous, unless 
they pose no or marginal threat. After there is reason to believe that the 
level of threat is low, even if the enemy soldier is not   hors de combat ,  the 
targeting forces would have to refrain from direct ﬁ  re. A rebuttable mirror-
presumption about combatant targetability remains generally faithful to 
IHL’s reliance on a status-based distinction, and stops short of a “policing 
model” test that would be based entirely on individual threat.  
  Naturally, nonthreatening combatants could still be killed where distin-
guishing them from others is impossible or where they are affected as collat-
eral damage. The point to emphasize here is that they should not be targeted 
intentionally, and that reasonable efforts to spare them should be made. 
  “Threat” in this context is not easily deﬁ  ned. The notion must be wider 
than in a classical self-defense paradigm (even though it is this paradigm 
71     See supra   note 35.   
72  Art. 51(3) of API.
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that is so often employed to justify killing in war), but also narrower than 
the current understanding that allows the targeting of combatants on the 
assumption that they all have the potential to inﬂ  ict damage. I employ the 
term “threat” here to denote something close to the “guilt” or “involvement” 
test that has been employed by governments in the war on terrorism. Three 
dimensions of possible threat are role, time, and geography. 
  As a general matter, it is possible that the application of each of these 
dimensions would depend on some subjective psychological perception of 
the concept of “threat,” which is hard to prescribe for or to pass judgment 
over. Zealous ideological/religious terrorists might be seen by one military 
commander as more threatening than a soldier in the Iraqi army, mak-
ing the former targetable even while swimming in the lake, and the latter 
a life we can spare. As in the case of the civilian who takes direct part in 
hostilities, the determination of threat would require a factual determina-
tion (characteristics of the individual target) as well as a judgment call (the 
degree to which these characteristics pose a threat).  
 5.1.1.  Role 
 Threat might be a function of role. For instance, a military cook’s contribu-
tion to the war effort, despite Napoleon’s famous observation, is minimal. 
In fact, in many armed forces billeting has been outsourced to private con-
tractors for exactly the reason that one requires no military training in order 
to be a cook. The irony here is that under the existing status-based distinc-
tions, the military cook is targetable, while the one working for the KBR 
company is probably not as he or she would not meet the “direct participa-
tion” standard (Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participa-
tion in Hostilities 2005). A useful way to test the presumption about threat 
might therefore be to ask whether the role played by the individual soldier 
is essentially a military one, or whether it is of the type often played by ci-
vilians who do not meet the “direct participation” standard. Naturally, the 
more militaries become reliant on civilians even for traditional “military” 
functions, such as those performed by Blackwater in Iraq, the less this form 
of rebuttal is useful. Still, soldiers who play roles and functions that have a 
clear civilian corollary, and which in their civilian corollary do not give rise 
to loss of immunity, should be spared. Such roles would include, among 
others, military spokespersons, judge advocate general ofﬁ  cers, bandsper-
sons, ﬁ  nancial management personnel, military police ofﬁ  cers, and so on. 
It is rare that soldiers performing these roles should take an active part in 
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combat. Their exclusion from direct attack would follow a similar logic to 
the protection accorded to medical units, military chaplains, or military 
personnel assigned to civil defense units. Of course, in different militaries 
various units might be assigned different roles (for instance, in some armies, 
military police takes an active part in the ﬁ  ghting), so that the role distinc-
tion would have to depend on the particular structure of the enemy forces.   
  Although role distinctions are certainly less bright than the soldier/
civilian line (provided, that is, that soldiers are wearing uniforms), they are not 
impossible to make. In many military contexts distinctions between combat, 
combat-support, or combat-service roles already exist, such as in differentiated 
salary payment (for instance, through special compensation for combat role 
or training level) or in military deployment plans. To make such distinctions 
obvious to an outside observer (who should presumably base his targeting 
decisions on them), differentiation also exists in military dress: There are dif-
ferent markings for different ranks, some units have their own colored berets 
(for example, the “Green Berets”), and the various services all have their own 
sets of uniforms (U.S. Dept. of the Army 2005); it is not inconceivable to think 
about different military dress that would correspond to combat/noncombat 
roles. 
73   To the extent that soldiers can cheat and wear different-colored berets 
or uniform, they can also cheat by disguising themselves as civilians. 
  From a legal standpoint, this change would require a reinterpretation 
of Article. 43 of API (which states that members of the armed forces are 
“combatants”), in differentiating soldiers who are clearly not serving in any 
combat role from those who are. In this sense, the 1907 formulation in 
the Hague Regulations that did distinguish among members of the armed 
forces in combat role and those who were not should be revived.  
  I do not suggest a distinction between conscripted and volunteer sol-
diers. Although I follow Walzer’s ([1977] 2006, 138–145) moral distinction 
between those who have been coerced to ﬁ  ght and those who seek ﬁ  ghting 
as a profession, I also agree with his ultimate conclusion that members of 
both groups might be equally threatening. 
74   In departing from Walzer, in-
dividual members of both groups might be unthreatening. 
73      This proposal was raised by Kasher (2009a, 24).    
74      In his discussion of “The Status of Individuals,” Walzer does not make any distinction between 
targeting conscripts and targeting volunteer soldiers or mercenaries. See also Coady’s (2008, 
167) description of a pre-battle speech delivered by a British military commander in Iraq, Col. 
Tim Collins, to his troops, ordering them to distinguish between those who “have resolved to 
ﬁ  ght and others [who] wish to survive.”   
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  5.1.2. The Temporal Dimension 
  “Threat” might depend on an individual’s ability to cause harm at a particu-
lar moment; thus, a military pilot is undoubtedly contributing to the war 
effort, but not while he is sleeping, bathing, playing soccer, or on leave. 
This temporal test is trickier than the role one, as the individual resumes 
his threatening stance once back on duty. But taken ad absurdum, any per-
son (including children) might become dangerous at a later point, either 
by joining the armed forces or by taking direct part in hostilities. Walzer’s 
presumption—that the soldier “allowed himself to become a dangerous 
man”—is simply unconvincing at a moment in which a particular soldier 
is clearly not dangerous.  
  Adopting a temporal test for “threat” would require moving away even 
further from bright-line rules of status or even role toward a standard of 
reasonableness. It will also require consideration of the possibilities of pre-
venting the threat from materializing at some later point.  
  One limitation of a standard of reasonableness appears as one considers 
the temporal test of threat as applied for civilians-turned-combatants under 
Article 51(3). To recall, the Israeli High Court of Justice interpreted the text 
“for such time” in an expansive manner, rejecting the notion of a “revolving 
door” (for example, the frequent change in status from civilian to combat-
ant and back to civilian again). After sufﬁ  cient ties were formed between 
the civilian and the hostile activity, the civilian could be attacked even when 
he was not taking part in hostilities at that particular time, a position con-
tested by some experts (Melzer 2009, 65–67). Any temporal test adopted for 
combatants must ensure that we do not reach an absurd result by which the 
bathing soldier cannot be attacked, while the bathing civilian can.  
  A particularly complicated case for the temporal test is that of retreating 
soldiers. Although soldiers in retreat are currently fair game, a temporal test 
of threat may impose limitations on the legitimacy of targeting them, even 
if they might become threatening at some later point. The argument against 
such limitations is obvious—the retreating soldiers choose not to surren-
der, but instead to rearm and regroup and possibly return to the battle zone 
better-equipped and better-prepared. But there are valid arguments in fa-
vor of limiting the permissible killing of retreating soldiers. One is that it is 
possible these soldiers would not return to the battle zone or that the war 
will end before they do so. This is particularly so if one considers the rising 
importance of alternative factors and forces in bringing a conﬂ  ict to an end. 
Another reason is the intuition of unfairness, as expressed by Kahn and 
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others. This intuition, although resonating of deontological   sensibilities, is 
not necessarily devoid of strategic consequences. Consider, for instance, the 
“Highway of Death” incident: On the night of February 26–27, 1991 (and 
then again, on March 2), U.S. airplanes struck an Iraqi convoy on Highway 
80, leading from Kuwait City to Basra. The strikes resulted in the deaths of 
hundreds of retreating Iraqi soldiers. The convoy retreat was highly wel-
comed by the American forces:  
  Now, it is almost like you ﬂ  ipped on the light in the kitchen late at night 
and the cockroaches start scurrying and we are killing them… . The long 
wait for the Iraqis to come up and ﬁ  ght has ﬁ  nally come to an end… . They 
are moving in columns; they are moving in small groups and convoys. It is 
exactly what we have been looking for and it looks to me like Saddam has 
lost his marbles (Walker 1991). 
75  
  Human-rights groups, on the other hand, were outraged. Kenneth Roth, 
deputy director of Human Rights Watch at the time, argued: “It wasn't a 
tactical retreat… It was a panicked, desperate ﬂ  ight and these were just low-
ly soldiers trying to get the hell out of there. It appears that this was a case 
of senseless slaughter” (Waller & Barry 1992, 16). 
  Under the existing rules, the Highway of Death was a lawful military ac-
tion, despite Roth’s protest; it is only if a temporal limitation on “threat” were 
to be adopted that the legitimacy of the “turkey shoot” would be question-
able. Ultimately, however, and despite the formal legality of the strikes, the 
images of the carnage generated such public uproar that the U.S. leadership 
was forced to cease its military campaign soon afterwards (Evans 1991).  
  Of course, one could argue that by contributing to the war’s speedy end, 
the incident might have ultimately saved more lives than had the convoys 
been spared and the war been allowed to continue. But there are two re-
sponses to this argument: One is that “we got the wrong people” (killing 
the beat-up retreating soldiers instead of continuing a campaign against 
the higher military or political leadership, the Republican Guard, the weap-
ons developers, and so on); the other is that this type of strict-utilitarian 
argument is both impossible to assess and quickly collapses any type of 
humanitarian constraint on warfare.  
  What is also interesting to note about the Highway of Death incident is 
that the decision to attack the retreating soldiers was not made by low-level 
75      Words of Lieutenant-Colonel Dick “Snake” White, commander of the Tomcat Squadron of 
U.S. Harrier.   
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ofﬁ  cers on the ground, but by the top echelons of the American military. 
In that sense, concerns about excessive discretion—and responsibility—of 
young soldiers who would have to apply complex targeting doctrines are 
less acute when large numbers of enemy troops are concerned. 
  5.1.3. The Geographical Dimension 
 Finally, ”threat” might have a geographical component, which together with 
the temporal dimension might further help to deﬁ  ne the concept of threat. 
A soldier bathing near his post is more threatening than the one bathing 
in a remote lake, and a soldier playing soccer on a military base is prob-
ably more dangerous than the one playing soccer in a civilian neighbor-
hood. This lower degree of threat has not been considered any impediment 
for legitimate targeting. In the case of the   Prosecutor v. Galic  , Bosnian Serb 
forces were accused of indiscriminate targeting when they shelled rounds 
at a group of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina forces playing football in a 
makeshift ﬁ  eld in a parking lot in the neighborhood of Dobrinja, Sarajevo. 
About 200 civilian spectators were watching the game. As a result of the 
shelling, more than ten soldiers and civilian spectators were killed and over 
a hundred were injured. In ﬁ  nding the defendants guilty, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia stated:  
  Although the number of soldiers present at the game was signiﬁ  cant, an at-
tack on a crowd of approximately 200 people, including numerous children, 
would clearly be expected to cause incidental loss of life and injuries to 
civilians excessive in relation to the direct and concrete military advantage 
anticipated. 
76  
  The crime, therefore, was the killing of civilians, not of soldiers who were 
clearly off duty, playing football, unarmed, and unthreatening. What makes 
these playing soldiers so different from the civilian spectators who were 
watching them play football is unclear, other than the fact that they have 
military training and return to the fray. Which brings us back to the tem-
poral dimension of “threat” and to the question whether a potential threat 
that might (or might not) materialize at some later point in time justiﬁ  es 
killing here and now. Neither the geographical dimension nor the temporal 
aspect of the concept of threat is compatible with the deliberate killing of 
soldiers playing soccer in an improvised ﬁ  eld. 
76     Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98–29-A, 387 (Nov. 30, 2006).   
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 Both the temporal and geographical dimensions of “threat” might require 
different applications to different theaters of war. American forces ﬁ  ghting 
a “global war on terrorism” might deny any geographical dimension to the 
concept of threat, while Russian forces targeting Chechen separatists will 
be more constrained in deﬁ  ning the theater of war. These dimensions of 
threat also vary with capabilities: Technologically advanced armies, which 
can plan and execute military operations from a great distance in real time, 
are less exposed to threat than less sophisticated forces that are more geo-
graphically concentrated and whose movement is slower. In those cases, 
“front” and “rear” become increasingly difﬁ  cult to distinguish, as the op-
erator of a predator drone might be many miles away from the drone it-
self. Particularly, where drones or other robots are deployed, the concept of 
threat becomes harder to apply, because the questions of “threat to whom” 
or “to what” become more difﬁ  cult to answer.  
  5.2. From Shoot-to-Kill to Kill-When-Necessary: Rereading “Military Necessity” 
 Nothing in the current laws of war requires combatants to exercise restraint 
when targeting enemy forces: They are not obliged to injure instead of kill 
or capture instead of injure. As the ICRC acknowledged in its Interpretive 
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities:  
 Clearly, the fact that a particular category of persons is not protected against 
offensive or defensive acts of violence is not equivalent to a legal entitle-
ment to kill such persons without further considerations. At the same time, 
the absence of an unfettered “right” to kill does not necessarily imply a 
legal   obligation to capture rather than kill regardless of the circumstances 
(Melzer 2009, 78). 
  In a footnote, the ICRC added the following caution: 
  It is in this sense that Pictet’s famous statement should be understood that 
“[i]f we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not 
wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not 
kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same military advantage, we 
must choose the one which causes the lesser evil”…. (Melzer 2009, fn. 221).  
  Although citing Pictet with agreement, the ICRC was then forced to concede:  
  During the expert meetings, it was generally recognized that the approach 
proposed by Pictet is unlikely to be operable in classic battleﬁ  eld situations 
involving large scale confrontations … and that armed forces operating in 
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situations of armed conﬂ  ict, even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry 
and means of observation, may not always have the means or opportunity 
to capture rather than kill... (Melzer 2009, fn. 221). 
  Clearly, Pictet’s call for the exercise of less-harmful means does not reﬂ  ect 
the customary interpretation of the laws of war, nor is it suggested in any 
military manual instructing soldiers on battleﬁ  eld conduct. In fact, the 
attempt by the ICRC to introduce the less-harmful-means test as part of 
the principle of military necessity has been rejected by the expert group 
meeting, not only, as the previous footnote from the Interpretive Guidance 
seems to suggest, for large-scale confrontations, but as a limiting feature of 
the principle of military necessity altogether.  
  But why should a less-harmful-means test not be a feature of the prin-
ciple of military necessity? Certainly, ﬁ  ghting forces already decide where 
and how to invest resources in the most efﬁ  cient and effective way, operating 
under a perpetual resource constraint. However, the current interpretation 
of “necessary” as including what is less costly or less risky or even merely 
convenient allows too broad a discretion for forces to attack available—rather 
than clearly “necessary”—targets. To bring the term “necessary” closer to its 
literal meaning, it should include a least-harmful means component; it is 
entirely possible to conceive of “necessary” as the least measure of harm by 
which to achieve a desired end. If the end might be achieved by incapacitating 
the enemy without killing him, then that is what “necessary” should mean. 
If so, attacking forces should prefer capture to killing, wherever feasible. And 
although feasibility might depend on tactical capabilities in a particular time 
and place, it is unclear why it should be ruled out altogether from “classic 
battleﬁ  eld situations involving large scale confrontations.”  
 A  ﬁ  rst move toward bringing “necessity” closer to its ordinary meaning 
has been made by the Israeli Supreme Court, which in the aforementioned 
decision on targeted killing ruled that when there was a feasible alternative 
of arrest, the government must exercise that alternative and refrain from 
killing. As commentators have noted, this requirement was not based on the 
existing laws of war, either with regard to civilians or combatants (Cohen & 
Shany 2007). Rather, it was introduced under a domestic constitutional 
principle of proportionality. In essence, it was an expression of the court’s 
uneasiness about the full implications of a “war on terror” paradigm and its 
backlash toward a law-enforcement model, in which the use of lethal force 
must be a last resort. In this sense, the Court followed Kahn’s (2002) move 
of importing policing doctrines into the laws of armed conﬂ  ict.  
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  Another move in this direction has been the research and development 
into nonlethal weapons (NLW) and the employment of police-like NLW in 
various theaters of conﬂ  icts. In fact, the U.S. defense establishment (mil-
itary and Department of Defense) is an active promoter of the research 
into and development of NLW (Allison, Kelley, & Garwin 2004, 3; Global 
Security 2009). Originally, interest in less-than-deadly weapons arose from 
the military’s deployment to nontraditional theaters, including humanitar-
ian interventions or military operations other than war. But this interest 
seems to have expanded beyond riot-control or law-and-order operations 
in complex environments, to include potential wartime capabilities, such 
as putting to sleep or stunning combatants, in more traditional settings 
(Allison, Kelley, & Garwin 2004, 9–10). If NLW prove effective, the ques-
tion becomes why it is necessary to employ lethal means, unless there is 
independent value in actually killing combatants.  
 Another different manifestation of a less-harmful-means test would be fa-
voring the targeting of military objects over military personnel. For instance, 
if one party has the opportunity to disable enemy aircraft, vehicles, muni-
tions, supplies, and so on, it should do so with preferably as few—rather 
than as many—human casualties (military and civilian) as possible. After the 
tools of war are destroyed, it would become easier to capture or otherwise 
disable enemy combatants without having to kill them (Roberts 2008, 960).  
  Of course, capturing enemy combatants imposes costs and burdens on 
the captor in terms of holding, transferring, and catering to the captives 
(the military, political, and legal costs of holding enemy combatants in 
Guantanamo Bay create a strong incentive to kill rather than capture); an 
advance warning might alert the enemy and allow it to better prepare for 
the attack; and stunned combatants might return to combat activity once 
the effects of the nonlethal strike wear off. But IHL already requires warring 
parties to assume certain burdens: It prohibits announcing that no quarter 
shall be given and orders the holding, transferring, and catering to captured 
or surrendering POWs; it prohibits the use of certain weapons that cause 
superﬂ  uous injury and unnecessary suffering; and it does not allow break-
ing any of these rules in the name of military necessity.  
 Ultimately, as in the case of an amended doctrine of distinction, the ques-
tion must be whether adding a less-harmful means condition to the inter-
pretation of the principle of military necessity imposes such burdens as to 
fundamentally break the balance struck by current IHL between the neces-
sities of war and humanitarian concerns. This question might undoubtedly 
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vary from one battleﬁ  eld to another, and different combat scenarios would 
allow—or restrict—the application of a capture-alternative. But ultimately, 
it would depend on the human value we choose to assign to the lives of 
combatants. 
 6.  CONCLUSION 
  It is the fate of the civilian harmed by war that has been the focus of inter-
national law’s attention ever since the end of World War II, and which has 
shaped the rhetoric and consciousness of those concerned with war. The 
term “enemy civilians” has been taken out from the Army Field Manuals, 
leaving only the generic protected class of “civilians.” International human 
rights activists consistently campaign on behalf of civilians affected by war, 
alongside the International Committee of the Red Cross that provides them 
with humanitarian assistance. An entire body of crimes against human-
ity has developed to supplement an older body of war crimes, with the 
well-being of civilians in mind. Whether or not enemy civilians are actu-
ally better off today than they were in past times is debatable, but they are 
  undoubtedly entitled to greater protections as a matter of law. 
  The fate of combatants ﬁ  ghting wars has beneﬁ  tted far less from these 
developments. As far as combatants are concerned, the laws and customs 
of war have changed very little since the Civil War, especially for those who 
are not   hors de combat  , adding some limitations on the types of weapons 
that may be used to kill but not on killing as such. Drew Faust (2008, 42) 
has described the dismayed attitude of Confederate soldiers toward Union 
sharpshooters: “To shoot a man as he defecated, or slept, or sat cooking or 
eating, or even as he was ‘sitting under a tree reading Dickens,’ could not 
easily be rationalized as an act of self-defense. Soldiers in camp wanted to 
think themselves off duty as targets as well as killers, and they found the 
intentionality and personalism involved in picking out and picking off a 
single man highly disturbing.”  
 And yet this sharpshooting was perfectly legal during the Civil War; more 
remarkably, it is still so today.  
  The question why we should treat combatants any differently from civil-
ians on the battleﬁ  eld largely depends on the values we want our system 
of laws of war to promote. Our current system of IHL sacriﬁ  ces soldiers in 
the name of protecting civilians. It is an extension of the dueling system, 
whereby we send a group of soldiers to ﬁ  ght another group of soldiers, 
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and the outcome of that ﬁ  ght determines the fate of compatriot civilians. 
Soldiers are thus instruments of war. We dress them up in uniform and 
that uniform deﬁ  nes them as instruments and obliterates their individual 
identity. 
77    
  In an international system that is state-centered, the dueling logic might 
persist in the face of any liberal individualistic commitments. As our system 
changes, the status of the dueling system might grow more precarious. For 
now, though, any amendment that departs from a rule-based right toward 
a standard-based judgment faces several difﬁ  culties, including asymmetries 
in compliance, more complex administrability, and potential for military 
and political exploitation. These are all real and substantial challenges, even 
if not conceptually or fundamentally different from other limitations on 
lawful warfare. Ultimately, the recognition of soldiers’ noninstrumental 
human value might require absorption of some degree of enhanced risk or 
cost to the enterprise of war.  
  Attempts at an amended reading of the principles of military necessity 
and distinction or a narrowed interpretation of the deﬁ  nition of “combat-
ants” have so far been met with resistance. But such attempts have been 
sparse and distant from the focus of the international humanitarian com-
munity’s attention. Geopolitical, normative, and technological advances, 
which have all shaped and reshaped the laws of war throughout history, 
make these attempts worthy and possible of success today. There is no rea-
son to reject them as improbable or unrealistic—at least, not more than 
banning anti-personnel landmines, or prohibiting the use of physical pres-
sure in interrogating POWs, or requiring warring parties to show con-
cern for the environmental impact of military operations. The laws of war 
change as public preferences and sensibilities call them to. They might very 
well change further to reﬂ  ect a growing care for the enemy, even enemy 
combatants. 
 
77      Uniforms are the “stamp of ownership the sovereign puts on his army” (Kutz 2005, 160–161).   
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